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INTRODUCTION 
Since the beginning of his pontificate, Pope Francis has offered to 
the world powerful signs of how we should aspire to treat each other as 
human beings, as brothers and sisters in the one human family.1 He has 
communicated his message and his teachings in myriad ways: through 
symbolic gestures; his presence and words at gatherings in our world’s 
most troubled places; brief messages, homilies and meditations; and 
official documents that continue the application of the principles of 
Catholic social teaching to contemporary social questions. 
What might these prophetic signs and statements mean for the 
dialogue between Catholic social thought and other disciplines? This 
Article focuses on how the teachings of Pope Francis may illuminate how 
to theorize the legal obligations of a bystander to a person in need of 
emergency assistance. In particular, it zeroes in on the so-called “easy 
rescue” cases in which assistance would seem to pose little or no risk to 
the bystander, often typified by the trope of a passerby who notices a 
                                                     
 1. To note just two examples, see Pope Francis, Photo Gallery from Homily: Mass of the Lord’s 
Supper (Mar. 28, 2013), http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/homilies/2013/documents/papa-
francesco_20130328_coena-domini.html [https://perma.cc/WY6B-UXY2] (Pope Francis washing the 
feet of young detainees from different ethnic and religious backgrounds); Faith Karmini, Pope 
Francis’s Embrace of a Severely Disfigured Man Touches the World, CNN (Nov. 7, 2013, 6:43 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/07/world/europe/pope-francis-embrace/ [https://perma.cc/M8UY-
SHP3]. 
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toddler drowning in a wading pool.2 In the teachings of Pope Francis, 
reflections on the moral obligations of bystanders—often in the form of 
meditations on the seminal “rescue” story, the Parable of the Good 
Samaritan, as well as extended analysis of the perils of a culture of 
indifference—are no mere footnote, but a central feature. 
Shouldn’t it be obvious that a powerful moral obligation to assist 
other human beings—neighbors in need—has important implications for 
legal and economic structures? In short, no, it is not obvious. Certainly, 
reflections on the growing creep of indifference to the needs and the pain 
of others pull in the direction of a strong moral obligation, but other 
features of the teachings of Pope Francis may complicate the analysis. For 
example, reflecting on another central theme of Pope Francis’s 
pontificate—the meaning and application of mercy in the Church and in 
society3—leads one to ask, which way does mercy cut? Not everyone is a 
“do-gooder” or inclined to be heroic.4 Might mercy also include a certain 
comprehension and embrace of the human limitations that people 
experience in their encounters with pain and violence? Who am I to judge? 
Further, in settings where Pope Francis is reflecting on the relationship 
between theological insights and business models, he admits that the Good 
Samaritan is “not enough.”5 Analysis of the systems that lead to both 
robbers and victims present a more complicated set of questions. 
What happens when the teaching of Pope Francis on the duties of 
bystanders—understood not as a flat and unidimensional assertion, but as 
a complex and multi-dimensional weave—is placed into dialogue with 
legal theory? This Article argues that an appreciation for the interior life 
and decision-making process of bystanders can help us to shed the flat 
caricatures on either end of the spectrum: on one hand, the unrealistically 
                                                     
 2. These “easy rescue” cases are a tiny subset of fact patterns regarding bystander interactions 
with victims of violence. In other work, I have explored fact patterns in which bystanders become 
“engaged spectators” by taking pictures or recording, and I have argued for the development of a new 
“tort of objectification” in order to hold such spectators accountable for the distinct injury that they 
inflict. See generally Amelia J. Uelmen, Crime Spectators and the Tort of Objectification, 12 U. MASS. 
L. REV. 68 (2017). 
 3. See, e.g., Pope Francis, Apostolic Letter: Misericordiae Vultus: Bull of Indiction of the 
Extraordinary Jubilee of Mercy (Apr. 11, 2015), https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/ 
apost_letters/documents/papa-francesco_bolla_20150411_misericordiae-vultus.html [https:// 
perma.cc/J2YA-78LW]; POPE FRANCIS, THE NAME OF GOD IS MERCY (Oonagh Stransky trans., 
2016). 
 4. This Article travels in a different direction than recent works that focus on the sociology and 
psychology of “do-gooders.” See, e.g., LARISSA MACFARQUHAR, STRANGERS DROWNING (2015). 
 5. See Pope Francis, Address to Participants in the “Economy of Communion” Meeting  
(Feb. 2, 2017) [hereinafter Economy of Communion], https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en 
/speeches/2017/february/documents/papa-francesco_20170204_focolari.html 
[https://perma.cc/BY7N-78C3]; see discussion infra note 123. 
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calm, cool, collected, utterly prepared superhero; and on the other, tort 
law’s villainous “moral monster.” 
With these caricatures out of the way, the Article then proceeds to 
explore how this more fleshed out picture of the relationship between law 
and morality might illuminate some of the more difficult questions at the 
heart of the dialogue, including the definition of freedom. In particular, it 
considers how to proceed when a key word or phrase at issue—in this case, 
freedom—is an “essentially contested concept,” defined in radically 
different ways because of seemingly diametrically opposed worldviews.6 
Often the social teachings of Pope Francis directly challenge the 
status quo. Say “no,” he advised, to that “spiritual asphyxia” that is “born 
of the pollution caused by indifference, by thinking that other people’s 
lives are not my concern.”7 But in the next breath the Pope added that we 
also need to say no to “the toxic pollution of empty and meaningless 
words, or harsh and hasty criticism, of simplistic analyses that fail to grasp 
the complexity of problems, especially the problems of those who suffer 
the most.”8 Taking up this double challenge, this Article concludes that 
while the “easy rescue”9 analysis may seem to be grounded in a healthy 
critique of indifference, it fails to grasp the deeper complexity of the 
encounter between bystanders and victims. When the legal analysis is 
informed by this insight, theorists can move forward to address more 
complex questions. 
I. THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF INDIFFERENCE 
It is not surprising that Pope Francis, a communicator who is 
sensitive to how well-known and well-loved stories and examples resonate 
with ordinary people, would make frequent and, at times, extended 
reference to the Parable of the Good Samaritan as recounted in the Gospel 
of Luke. The text of the Parable follows: 
5And behold, a lawyer stood up to put him to the test, saying, 
“Teacher, what shall I do to inherit eternal life?” 26He said to him, 
“What is written in the law? How do you read?” 27And he answered, 
“You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all 
                                                     
 6. See W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROCS. ARISTOTELEAN SOC’Y 167 
(1955–1956); see also Amelia J. Uelmen, Mapping a Method for Dialogue: Exploring the Tensions 
Between Razian Autonomy and Catholic Solidarity as Applied to Euthanasia, 2 J. MORAL THEOLOGY 
133, 144 (2013) (employing the concept to analyze sharp differences between liberal theory and 
Catholic social thought). 
 7. Pope Francis, Homily: Ash Wednesday (Mar. 1, 2017), https://w2.vatican.va/content/ 
francesco/en/homilies/2017/documents/papa-francesco_20170301_omelia-ceneri.html [https:// 
perma.cc/PYG4-LCMP]. 
 8. Id. 
 9. For a description of the “easy rescue” cases, see discussion supra note 2. 
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your soul, and with all your strength, and with all your mind; and 
your neighbor as yourself.” 28And he said to him, “You have 
answered right; do this, and you will live.” 29But he, desiring to 
justify himself, said to Jesus, “And who is my neighbor?” 30Jesus 
replied, “A man was going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and he 
fell among robbers, who stripped him and beat him, and departed, 
leaving him half dead. 31Now by chance a priest was going down that 
road; and when he saw him he passed by on the other side. 32So 
likewise a Levite, when he came to the place and saw him, passed by 
on the other side. 33But a Samaritan, as he journeyed, came to where 
he was; and when he saw him, he had compassion, 34and went to him 
and bound up his wounds, pouring on oil and wine; then he set him 
on his own beast and brought him to an inn, and took care of him. 
35And the next day he took out two denarii and gave them to the 
innkeeper, saying, ‘Take care of him; and whatever more you spend, 
I will repay you when I come back.’ 36Which of these three, do you 
think, proved neighbor to the man who fell among the robbers?” 37He 
said, “The one who showed mercy on him.” And Jesus said to him, 
“Go and do likewise.”10 
In a visit to a hospital during his 2013 trip to Brazil, Pope Francis 
drew his audience into the story with a reflection on the reactions of the 
various characters in the story. 
In the Gospel, we read the parable of the Good Samaritan, that speaks 
of a man assaulted by robbers and left half dead at the side of the 
road. People pass by him and look at him. But they do not stop, they 
just continue on their journey, indifferent to him: it is none of their 
business! How often we say: it’s not my problem! How often we turn 
the other way and pretend not to see! Only a Samaritan, a stranger, 
sees him, stops, lifts him up, takes him by the hand, and cares for 
him.11 
Even more forcefully, during a 2013 homily at Lampedusa, the island 
in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea that has witnessed the catastrophic 
drownings of countless migrants attempting to cross in rickety boats from 
North Africa, Pope Francis challenged his listeners to recognize 
themselves in those who failed to respond to the victim’s needs: 
We have fallen into the hypocrisy of the Priest and the Levite whom 
Jesus described in the Parable of the Good Samaritan: we see our 
brother half dead on the side of the road, and perhaps we say to 
                                                     
 10. Luke 10:25–37. 
 11. Pope Francis, Address to the St. Francis of Assisi of the Providence of God Hospital, Brazil 
(July 24, 2013), https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2013/july/documents/papa-
francesco_20130724_gmg-ospedale-rio.html [https://perma.cc/ZZE6-87NE ] (citing Luke 10:29–35). 
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ourselves: “poor soul…!”, and then go on our way. It’s not our 
responsibility, and with that we feel reassured, assuaged.12 
On this occasion, the story of the Good Samaritan served as a backdrop 
for a ringing indictment of the “globalization of indifference,” which then 
became one of the running themes of his pontificate.13 
The culture of comfort, which makes us think only of ourselves, 
makes us insensitive to the cries of other people, makes us live in 
soap bubbles which, however lovely, are insubstantial; they offer a 
fleeting and empty illusion which results in indifference to others; 
indeed, it even leads to the globalization of indifference. We have 
become used to the suffering of others: it doesn’t affect me; it doesn’t 
concern me; it’s none of my business.14 
Pope Francis then drew out a further connection to the Genesis story of 
Cain’s murder of Abel and to what might be described as that very first 
lame excuse for avoidance of responsibility: “Am I my brother’s keeper?” 
The Pope laments: 
Who is responsible for the blood of these brothers and sisters of ours? 
Nobody! That is our answer: It isn’t me; I don’t have anything to do 
with it; it must be someone else, but certainly not me. Yet God is 
asking each of us: “Where is the blood of your brother which cries 
out to me?”15 
                                                     
 12. Pope Francis, Homily: “Arena” Sports Camp, Salina Quarter (July 8, 2013) [hereinafter 
Lampedusa], http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/homilies/2013/documents/papa-francesco_ 
2013008_ omelia-lampedusa.html [https://perma.cc/TM9R-ZBCB]. 
 13. See, e.g., Pope Francis, Apostolic Exhortation, Evangelii gaudium  
para. 54 (2013), http://www.vatican.va/evangelii-gaudium/en/files/assets/basic-html/index.html#1 
[https://perma.cc/4ZWU-23BZ] [hereinafter Pope Francis, Evangelii gaudium] (“To sustain a lifestyle 
which excludes others, or to sustain enthusiasm for that selfish ideal, a globalization of indifference 
has developed. Almost without being aware of it, we end up being incapable of feeling compassion at 
the outcry of the poor, weeping for other people’s pain, and feeling a need to help them, as though all 
this were someone else’s responsibility and not our own. The culture of prosperity deadens us; we are 
thrilled if the market offers us something new to purchase. In the meantime, all those lives stunted for 
lack of opportunity seem a mere spectacle; they fail to move us.”); Pope Francis, Encyclical: Laudato 
si’ (On Care for Our Common Home) (2015) [hereinafter Laudato], 
http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papafrancesco_20150524_enciclica
-laudato-si.html [https://perma.cc/4ZWU-23BZ] (noting widespread indifference to refugees due to 
climate change: “Sadly, there is widespread indifference to such suffering, which is even now taking 
place throughout our world. Our lack of response to these tragedies involving our brothers and sisters 
points to the loss of that sense of responsibility for our fellow men and women upon which all civil 
society is founded.”); see Pope Francis, Evangelii gaudium at para. 52 (discussing the need to reduce 
the “globalization of indifference” regarding the human impact of foreign debt); id. at Concluding 
Prayer (“Enlighten those who possess power and money that they may avoid the sin of 
indifference…”). 
 14. Lampedusa, supra note 12. 
 15. Id. 
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Throughout his pontificate, Pope Francis has returned frequently to 
the Parable in his speeches and homilies. For example, in April 2016, he 
referred to the story to specifically indict those whose focus on religious 
obligations might actually prevent them from seeing their neighbor’s 
needs: “They were in a hurry . . . The priest perhaps looked at his watch 
and said: ‘But I’ll be late for Mass . . .’ The other one said: ‘But, I don’t 
know if the Law allows me, because there is blood there and I will be 
impure . . . .’”16 From this, the Pope draws out the connection between 
“true worship” and service to one’s neighbor: 
Let us never forget it: in the face of the suffering of so many people 
destroyed by hunger, by violence and by injustices, we cannot remain 
spectators. What does it mean to ignore man’s suffering? It means to 
ignore God! If I do not approach that man, or that woman, that child, 
that elderly man or elderly woman that is suffering, I do not come 
close to God.17 
In a July 2016 Angelus message, Pope Francis reiterated the strong 
identification between those who, in their suffering, ask for our attention 
and the presence of God. He exhorted: 
The Lord will say to us: ‘But you, you remember that time on the 
road from Jerusalem to Jericho? That man was me half dead. Do you 
remember? That hungry child was me. Do you remember? The 
migrant who many want to drive out it was me. Those grandparents 
alone, abandoned in nursing homes, it was me. That sick person alone 
in the hospital, that no one goes to see, was me.18 
Wouldn’t this very strong connection between a scriptural point of 
reference and a clear ethical commitment be enough to draw out 
straightforward consequences under legal theory?19 It is tempting to stop 
here.20 But I believe that other reflections of Pope Francis on the Parable 
somewhat complicate the question. 
                                                     
 16. Pope Francis, General Audience (Apr. 27, 2016), https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/ 
en/audiences/2016/documents/papa-francesco_20160427_udienza-generale.html [https://perma.cc/ 
HK4X-22D2]. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Pope Francis, Angelus (July 10, 2016), https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/angelus/ 
2016/documents/papa-francesco_angelus_20160710.html [https://perma.cc/862E-25LL]. 
 19. Such would track the almost instinctual reaction that generations of law students have had 
when they study examples of the common law no duty to rescue. See, e.g., Ingrid Hillinger, The Duty 
to Rescue, 6 COLONIAL L. 8, 9 (1976) (describing the reaction of her torts class to “these unsavory 
cases”: “Our moral sensibilities were deeply offended. Almost instinctively we turned to the legal 
system. ‘There ought to be a law,’ we cried.”). See also discussion infra note 120. 
 20. Some thoughtful theological studies strongly emphasize this dimension of the social 
teaching. See, e.g., ELISABETH T. VASKO, BEYOND APATHY: A THEOLOGY FOR BYSTANDERS (2015). 
My work is not a direct critique of this approach but an argument that the implications for legal theory 
require further and more complex layers. 
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II. MERCY AND THE INTERIOR LIFE OF BYSTANDERS 
A. Which Way Does Mercy Cut? 
The teachings of Pope Francis also include reflections on the Good 
Samaritan as an example of another important theme in his pontificate: 
mercy. For Pope Francis, mercy is tied to getting one’s hands dirty, with 
not being afraid to take on—or be contaminated by—the “smell of the 
sheep.”21 Mercy is “that love which embraces the misery of the human 
person.”22 Even more graphically, “Mercy gets its hands dirty. It touches, 
it gets involved, it gets caught up with others, it gets personal.”23 
In a video message to a national gathering of the Argentinian “Open 
Hands” project, the Pope carefully distinguished the concept of mercy 
from that of pity or philanthropy. Reflecting on the Parable of the Good 
Samaritan as well as Jesus’s encounter with the widow of Nain (Luke 
7:13), he explained: 
[Mercy is] when the other’s misery, or a situation of grief or misery, 
enters my heart and I let that situation touch my heart. . . . And this is 
the way: there is no mercy unless the heart is broken, a heart wounded 
by another’s misery, because of another’s painful situation; [it is] a 
heart that lets itself be wounded.24 
Ultimate mercy is a gift from the Lord, grounded in one’s own 
experience of weakness and vulnerability: 
One can only be merciful if one has truly felt the Lord’s mercy, 
otherwise one cannot be merciful. If you feel that your sin is assumed, 
forgiven, forgotten by God, you are merciful, and from having 
experienced mercy you will be able to be merciful. If mercy doesn’t 
come from your heart, it isn’t mercy.25  
What happens to the heart in the process? When one is wounded by 
another’s misery, the heart becomes “like a compass.”26 Pope Francis even 
suggests that this “compass” might take over other more rational 
assessments—to the point of not knowing “where it is standing because of 
                                                     
 21. Pope Francis, Homily: Chrism Mass (Mar. 28, 2013), http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/ 
en/homilies/2013/documents/papa-francesco_20130328_messa-crismale.html [https://perma.cc/ 
D8RA-ZG49]. 
 22. Pope Francis, Homily: Feast of Our Lady of Guadalupe (Dec. 12, 2015), 
https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/homilies/2015/documents/papa-francesco_20151212_ 
omelia-guadalupe.html [https://perma.cc/DD34-6R87]. 
 23. Pope Francis, First Retreat Meditation, Jubilee for Priests (June 2, 2016), 
https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2016/june/documents/papa-francesco_ 
20160602_giubileo-sacerdoti-prima-meditazione.html [https://perma.cc/ES3E-38MF]. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
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what it is feeling.”27 This, according to the Pope, is where the “return trip” 
begins. 
And thus the path goes from my misery that has received mercy, to 
the misery of the other; from my misery loved by God, to the love of 
the other’s misery; from my misery loved in my heart, to its 
expression with my hands, and that is mercy. Mercy is a trip from the 
heart to the hands.28 
But when considering the obligations of bystanders, which way does 
mercy cut? As will be discussed more fully below, multidirectional traffic 
may be much more complex than a one-way street. A fuller exploration of 
the encounter between one person’s need and another person’s response 
invites one to consider not only the “misery” of the victim on the side of 
the road but also the “misery” of the bystander, and all that might get in 
the way of an otherwise heroic response. 
One of the contexts in which Pope Francis fleshes out the dimension 
of mercy for those who may have failed to meet obligations and 
expectations is in his conversations with prisoners. For example, meeting 
with those detained at the Curran Fromhold Correctional Facility during 
his visit to the United States in September 2015, commenting on the phrase 
from John 13:8, “You will never wash my feet,” the Pope explained: 
In those days, it was the custom to wash someone’s feet when they 
came to your home. That was how they welcomed people. The roads 
were not paved, they were covered with dust, and little stones would 
get stuck in your sandals. Everyone walked those roads, which left 
their feet dusty, bruised or cut from those stones. That is why we see 
Jesus washing feet, our feet, the feet of his disciples, then and now. 
We all know that life is a journey, along different roads, different 
paths, which leave their mark on us.29 
Dirty from the “dust-filled roads of life and history,” we all need to 
be cleansed, the Pope confessed, “All of us. Myself, first and foremost.”30 
The profound limitations that mark the human condition touch everyone: 
“It is painful when we see people who think that only others need to be 
cleansed, purified, and do not recognize that their weariness, pain and 
                                                     
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Pope Francis, Address to Detainees at Curran-Fromhold Correctional Facility (Sept.  
27, 2015), https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2015/september/documents/papa-
francesco_20150927_usa-detenuti.html [https://perma.cc/E7SP-LUWB]. 
 30. Id. 
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wounds are also the weariness, pain and wounds of society.”31 To draw a 
phrase from a different context, when we discern that not everyone may 
respond in a heroic way to the needs of others, especially in the context of 
exposure to pain or violence, “Who am I to judge?”32 
So which way does mercy cut? It may be difficult to tell. We must 
be on guard, Pope Francis exhorted the United States Congress during his 
September 2015 visit, against the temptation of “the simplistic 
reductionism which sees only good or evil; or, if you will, the righteous 
and sinners. The contemporary world, with its open wounds which affect 
so many of our brothers and sisters, demands that we confront every form 
of polarization which would divide it into these two camps.”33 
B. Bystanders as “Moved From the Gut” 
Considering the role of bystanders to a victim in need of emergency 
assistance, what happens when we attempt to remove that polarizing filter 
that divides the world into the righteous and the sinners? This Section 
explores how two dimensions emerge: first, a heightened attention to the 
complex interior life not only of victims but also of bystanders; and 
second, a greater appreciation for the role of emotions in the assessment 
of bystander responses. 
Returning to the Parable of the Good Samaritan in light of Pope 
Francis’s reflections on mercy, one might query the extent to which the 
text itself illuminates the Samaritan’s emotional state. What was he 
thinking? What might have been the steps of his decision-making process? 
To use the phrase of Pope Francis, how might one describe that “round 
trip” of an encounter with another’s “misery” to the hands-on actions of 
service and healing? 
It is often hard to get a glimpse of what might reveal something of 
the Samaritan’s interior life because our attention is often drawn to the 
action of the rescuer. In artistic portrayals of the Parable of the Good 
Samaritan, rarely do the depictions draw our eyes to aspects that might 
reveal something of the Samaritan’s emotional core, such as facial 
                                                     
 31. Id.; see also First Retreat Meditation, supra note 23 (describing the “embarrassed dignity” 
of the “prodigal yet beloved son” (Luke 15:11–13), and that the place where “dignity and 
embarrassment exist side by side” is “how our Father’s heart beats”). 
 32. Pope Francis, Press Conference During Return Flight from Apostolic Journey to Rio de 
Janiero (July 28, 2013), http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2013/july/documents/ 
papa-francesco_20130728_gmg-conferenza-stampa.html [https://perma.cc/H6U9-TX3M] (answering 
a question regarding homosexual priests: “If someone is gay and is searching for the Lord and has 
good will, who am I to judge?”). 
 33. Pope Francis, Address to Joint Session of the United States Congress (Sept. 24, 2015), 
https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2015/september/documents/papa-francesco_ 
20150924_usa-us-congress.html [https://perma.cc/UUB3-N6WV]. For a critique of “simplistic 
analyses,” see also Homily: Ash Wednesday, supra note 7. 
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expression. For example, in one of the earliest paintings of the parable, a 
work by Domenico Fetti, we see only the Samaritan’s back, as he lifts the 
victim onto his horse.34 Rembrandt’s 1644 pen and brush sketch 
foregrounds the activity of the caring for the victim, but the Samaritan’s 
lightly detailed face seems focused on the bottle of oil, in concentration on 
the activity at hand.35 Later works by Delacroix and Van Gogh give a 
glimpse of the Samaritan’s face but without much detail, as the focus of 
the painting remains on the action of lifting the victim onto a horse.36 For 
example, in Delacroix’s 1852 work, the Samaritan’s face is visible as he 
leans over the man to tend his wounds, but the soft brush strokes do not 
give much detail of his facial expressions.37 Likewise, Bartholdi’s small 
bronze sculpture depicts the Samaritan as curved over the victim, with his 
face down and focused on the victim’s body as he cleans the victim’s 
wounds.38 One very striking exception to this pattern is Swiss painter 
Ferdinand Hodler’s painting, in which the eye is immediately drawn to the 
fully depicted front view of the face of the Samaritan: old and wrinkled, 
but vibrant and expressive as he seems to be trying to communicate with 
the victim.39 
Just as the artistic focus on action makes it difficult to catch a glimpse 
of the Samaritan’s emotional core, so too, the emphasis on action in the 
interpretation of the text of the Parable often eclipses a more complex 
assessment of the Samaritan’s motives and decision-making process. For 
example, common translations of the Samaritan’s primary motivation for 
action often seem to connote a kind of reasonable and controlled conferral 
of a benefit on the victim: he had compassion; he showed pity or mercy.40 
                                                     
 34. See Domenico Fetti, Parable of the Good Samaritan (ca. 1662), in Boston Museum of Fine 
Art; see also Rembrandt, The Good Samaritan at the Inn (1633) (depicting the Samaritan with his 
back turned as he negotiated with the innkeeper; eyes are also drawn to the fairly large detail in the 
foreground of a dog in the process of defecating). 
 35. Rembrandt, The Good Samaritan Tends the Wounded Man (1644). 
 36. See Eugene Delacroix, The Good Samaritan (1849); Vincent van Gogh, The Good Samaritan 
(1890). 
 37. Eugene Delacroix, The Good Samaritan (1852). 
 38. Frédéric-Auguste Bartholdi, Le Bon Samaritain (1853). 
 39. See Ferdinand Hodler, Good Samaritan (1886); see also Ferdinand Hodler, The Merciful 
Samaritan (1875) (Samaritan seems to be in a modern business vest; eyes are lowered and focused on 
the victim’s face as he tries to give him something to drink). For other examples of Hodler’s capacity 
to capture the interior life of his subjects through facial expressions, see Ferdinand Hodler, A Troubled 
Soul (1889) and Las de la vie (Tired of Life) (1892). 
 40. The earliest Latin translation, the Vulgate, and later English translations generally fail to 
capture the deeper dimensions of the word, often translating it with the potentially cleaner and more 
rational “mercy” or “compassion.” See, e.g., Luke 10:33 (VULGATE) (“Samaritanus autem quidam iter 
faciens venit secus eum et videns eum misericordia motus est.”); Luke 10:33 (NEW INTERNATIONAL 
VERSION) (“when he saw him, he took pity on him”); Luke 10:33 (KING JAMES VERSION) (“when he 
saw him, he had compassion on him); Luke 10:33 (NEW AMERICAN STANDARD BIBLE) (“when he saw 
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But as recounted in Luke, the Greek verb which describes the 
Samaritan’s motivation, σπλαγχνίζεσθαι, is much stronger, rawer, and 
potentially boiling over with uncontrolled emotion. Based on the noun 
“splangchna,” which refers to “bowels” or vital organs such as the heart, 
the liver, and the intestines, the verb ἐσπλαγχνίσθη (esplanchnisthē) can 
be literally translated as “feeling a tug from the gut or the bowels.”41 A 
more in-depth analysis of this word helps to flesh out Pope Francis’s 
insight that the heart—the seat of the emotions—becomes the “compass,” 
and therefore also breaks open the legal analysis to a more complex 
consideration of how the emotional interior life of bystanders impacts the 
decision-making process. 
In the New Testament, σπλαγχνίζεσθαι is an unusual word with a 
somewhat complex history. A few studies note a distinction between the 
Hebrew and Greek conceptual streams that inform the metaphorical 
threads for interpretation.42 As Orsolina Montevecchi explains: “In the 
classical thread, ‘bowels’ (viscere) are conceived as the seat of strong and 
instinctive passions: anger, fury, anguished anxiety, suffering, passionate 
love; passions that disturb and consume man. The word corresponds more 
or less to ‘heart.’”43 
A brief survey of the use of σπλαγχνίζεσθαι in ancient Greek 
literature also indicates its association with raw emotion—for example, 
extreme anger44 or erotic desire.45 Montevecchi argues that this tradition 
                                                     
him, he felt compassion”); Luke 10:33 (NEW AMERICAN BIBLE) (“who came upon him was moved 
with compassion at the sight”). 
 41. See generally Orsolina Montevecchi, Viscere di misericordia, 43 RIVISTA BIBLICA 125 
(1995) (translation from the original Italian, infra, is my own). 
 42. See, e.g., KENNETH E. BAILEY, THE CROSS AND THE PRODIGAL 68 (2d ed. 2005) (“For the 
Greeks, the abdomen was the seat of the violent passions of anger and lust. The Hebrews, however, 
understood it to be the center of tender affections, such as kindness and compassion.”). 
 43. Montevecchi, supra note 41, at 126. 
 44. See AESCHYLUS, AGAMEMNON 995 (Loeb Classical Library, 1930),  http://classics.mit.edu/ 
Aeschylus/agamemnon.html [https://perma.cc/4D2R-QLHT] (foreboding chorus predicting a murder: 
“Not for naught is my bosom disquieted as my heart throbs against my justly aboding breast in eddying 
tides that presage [the coming doom]”); HERODAS, MIMIAMBOI (THE MIMES) III:42 (Walter Headlam 
ed., 1966), https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=nnc2.ark:/13960/t4qj8r93j;view=1up;seq=4 [https:// 
perma.cc/RZK6-4LSW] (exasperated mother making the case to the school master that her son should 
be flogged for his misdeeds: “What do you suppose I feel inside—poor me—whenever I see him!”) 
(italics are my own, indicating the translation of σπλαγχνίζεσθαι). 
 45. See, e.g., DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS, THE ROMAN ANTIQUITIES XI 35:4  
(Loeb Classical Library, 1950), http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/e/roman/texts/dionysius_of_ 
halicarnassus/home.html [https://perma.cc/43NQ-N8SF] (description of a cruel and manipulative 
tyrant’s efforts to possess a young girl betrothed to another: “his soul turgid and his bowels inflamed 
because of his love of the girl, neither paid heed to the pleas of her defenders . . . and furthermore 
resented the sympathy shown for her by the bystanders, as though he himself deserved greater pity 
and had suffered greater torments from the comeliness which had enslaved him.”); HERODAS, 
MIMIAMBOI (THE MIMES) I:57 (Walter Headlam ed. 1966), https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/ 
pt?id=uc1.b000771539;view=1up;seq=10 [https://perma.cc/KS8M-F3CQ] (old nurse goading a 
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runs parallel to the Semitic thread that is then incorporated into the New 
Testament.46 The meaning is still strong, physical, raw and expressive but 
nonetheless adequately captured in the Greek word for “pity” or 
“mercy”—eleo.47 
The Lucan texts, however, raise a further question. Given that Luke’s 
specific audience was the Gentile world, how should the cultural stream 
of Luke’s Greek vocabulary be characterized—as Semitic or classical? It 
seems that in choosing between σπλαγχνίζεσθαι and eleo, Luke would 
have been sensitive to how it sounded for the classically trained ear as 
well. 
As Pope Francis also infers in his “Open Hands” message, Luke’s 
other references to σπλαγχνίζεσθαι seem to connote a kind of over-the-top 
sense of being completely carried away by strong emotions. Wounded, 
overcome by a sense of connection to others’ misery, the heart seems to 
lose its grounding, to the point of not knowing “where it is standing 
because of what it is feeling.”48 For example, in the Parable of the Prodigal 
Son, the word is used to describe the father’s manner of welcoming home 
the younger son who had just frolicked away the family’s inheritance, 
living a life of ill repute.49 Social and historical studies of the context 
indicate that the father was behaving in an extraordinary and perhaps even 
irrational manner. Knowing that upon his return to the village, the son 
would probably be subject to taunt songs and other verbal and perhaps 
even physical abuse, the father completely humiliates himself by running 
towards him.50 Generally, as Kenneth Bailey explains, “An Oriental 
nobleman with flowing robes never runs anywhere. To do so is 
humiliating.”51 At this point in the story, rational discourse completely 
                                                     
married woman to turn her interests to a young man: “He saw you at the Descent of Mise, and his 
desire was fired with love, and his heart goaded; he leaves not my house night nor day but weeps over 
me and coaxes me and is dying of desire.” (emphasis added)); see also Oliver Cromwell, Letter to the 
General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, August 3, 1650, in 2 WRITING AND SPEECHES OF OLIVER 
CROMWELL 303 (Wilbur C. Abbot, ed. 1939), http://www.olivercromwell.org/Letters_and_speeches/ 
letters/Letter_129.pdf [https://perma.cc/BJE5-8DNR] (“Is it therefore infallibly agreeable to the Word 
of God, all that you say? I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible you may be 
mistaken.”). 
 46. Montevecchi, supra note 41, at 126. 
 47. Id.; see also E. MacLaurin & B. Colin, The Semitic Background Use of “En Splanchnois” 
103 PALESTINIAN EXPLORATION Q. 42 (1971). 
 48. First Retreat Meditation, supra note 23. 
 49. Luke 15:11–32. 
 50. KENNETH E. BAILEY, POET AND PEASANT 181 (1976) [hereinafter POET]. 
 51. Id. at 181–82 (quoting Ben Sirach: “A man’s manner of walking tells you what he is.”; 
Weatherhead: “It is so very undignified in Eastern eyes for an elderly man to run. Aristotle says, ‘Great 
men never run in public.’”). 
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breaks down; the son forgets his prepared speech, overwhelmed by the 
father’s physical demonstration of love.52 
The word’s location at the center of the Good Samaritan parable 
indicates that it was chosen carefully.53 In the two other places where Luke 
used this word in his Gospel he followed a similar textual pattern. In both 
the Parable of the Prodigal Son (Luke 15:20), and in his description of 
Jesus’ healing of the widow’s son at Nain (Luke 7:13), the verb is placed 
at the center of the text, and in both instances the word marks a turning 
point in the account.54 
The raw, emotional depth of the word—the sense of being taken by 
an overwhelming reaction to the situation—also matches well the extreme 
risk that the Samaritan was taking in approaching the victim. As a general 
matter, Bailey notes, Samaritans were classified as heretics and 
schismatic, in bitter strife with the Jews: “The Samaritans were publicly 
cursed in the synagogues; and a petition was daily offered up praying God 
that the Samaritans might not be partakers of eternal life.”55 
Specifically, what did the Samaritan risk? Risks included contact 
with what could have been a corpse, which could have led to 
contamination extending to his animal and his goods.56 It also included 
further attack by robbers, who may have stayed their hands upon meeting 
a more respected priest or Levite.57 In the process of administering the first 
aid, if the man came to consciousness the Samaritan risked the possibility 
of insult for his kindness, because “oil and wine are forbidden objects if 
they emanate from a Samaritan,” and because by accepting such objects, 
the wounded man would be required to pay tithes for them.58 In bringing 
the victim to the inn, the Samaritan also risked retaliation from the families 
and friends of the very person whom he had aided.59 As Bailey explained: 
                                                     
 52. See also Luke 7:13 (using σπλαγχνίζεσθαι to describe Jesus’s response to a widow in the city 
of Nain whose son had just died). 
 53. See, e.g., Maarten J.J. Menken, The Position of σπλαγχνίζεσθαι and σπλάγχνα in the Gospel 
of Luke, 30 NOVUM TESTAMENTUM 107, 111–12 (1988) (numeric analysis locates the word at the 
center of the 136 words spoken by Jesus); POET, supra note 50, at 72–73 (categorizing the parable as 
a “Parabollic Ballad” employing a series of three-lined stanzas in which each stanza introduces a new 
scene or significant shift of action and featuring a structure of “inverted parallelism,” in which the 
Samaritan reverses the actions of the three previous actors—the robbers, the priest, and the Levite; the 
word σπλαγχνίζεσθαι is at the center of this “reversal,” representing the center of the text and the 
turning point in the story). 
 54. Menken, supra note 53, at 108–09. 
 55. KENNETH E. BAILEY, THROUGH PEASANT EYES 48 (1980) (citing Osterley) [hereinafter 
PEASANT EYES]. 
 56. See generally JACOB MILGROM, LEVITICUS: A BOOK OF RITUAL AND ETHICS 150–53 (2004) 
(outline of purification procedures and effects, including corpse-contamination). 
 57. PEASANT EYES, supra note 55, at 48. 
 58. Id. at 50. 
 59. Id. at 49. 
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The Samaritan, by allowing himself to be identified, runs a grave risk 
of having the family of the wounded man seek him out, to take 
vengeance on him . . . The stranger who involves himself in an 
accident is often considered partially, if not totally, responsible for 
the accident. After all, why did he stop? Irrational minds seeking a 
focus for their retaliation do not make rational judgments, especially 
when the person involved is from a hated minority community. . . . 
Caution would lead him to leave the wounded man at the door of the 
inn and disappear.60 
Considering these risks—contamination, attack, ingratitude, and violent 
retaliation—it would not seem to be a stretch to characterize the 
Samaritan’s response as emotional, impulsive, and irrational. 
In this light, the difference between σπλαγχνίζεσθαι and eleo does 
have an impact on the interpretation of the Parable. The discrepancy 
between the two words can be read to highlight the uniquely astounding 
dimensions of the kind of love to which Jesus was calling both the lawyer 
and his listeners, and that if one remains only on a “rational” level of 
engagement, it can be difficult even to perceive this dimension of love. 
The use of the word σπλαγχνίζεσθαι conjures up not an elegant kindness 
that bestows gifts of charity on others, but a gut-level, almost physiological 
connection to other human beings in which one can do nothing other than 
to run the irrational risk of getting involved, not so much because of a  
well-laid plan, but because of the raw tug of an emotional connection. 
In any case, a close read of the Parable brings us to the conclusion 
that it is an inapt metaphor for any kind of assistance that is clean, easy, 
reasonable and risk-free. Which way does this cut? I do not think that Jesus 
is holding up as a moral template that all passersby need to take on 
extraordinary risks in order to fulfill their obligations under the moral law. 
But I do think the story stands as an invitation to recognize that the 
substratum for a discussion about what bystanders owe to vulnerable 
victims in an emergency situation is a common—and largely  
emotional—connection to each other as human beings. 
C. “From Jerusalem to Jericho”: Another Look at the  
Darley & Batson Experiment 
In the light of this exegesis, it is interesting to consider how the 
famous social psychology experiment by John Darley and Daniel Batson 
informed reflection on legal obligations.61 The two researchers explored 
                                                     
 60. Id. at 52. 
 61. John M. Darley & C. Daniel Batson, “From Jerusalem to Jericho”: A Study in Dispositional 
and Situational Variables in Helping Behavior, 27 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 100 (1973). The 
subjects were forty students at Princeton Theological Seminary. Id. 
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the correlation between helping behavior and personality variables. 
Personality variables focused on the subjects’ perceptions of how 
religiosity related to perception and action in the world.62 Some subjects 
were instructed to give a short talk on the Parable of the Good Samaritan, 
while others were instructed to focus their talk on job-related prospects for 
seminary students.63 For another variable, the experiment infused three 
different levels of “hurry” infused in the instructions. When instructed to 
go to the next building, some of the subjects were averted to the “high-
hurry” condition in which the assistant looked at his watch, and then said: 
“Oh, you’re late. They were expecting you a few minutes ago. We’d better 
get moving. The assistant should be waiting for you so you’d better hurry. 
It shouldn’t take but just a minute.”64 For the “intermediate-hurry” 
condition, the text was: “The assistant is ready for you, so please go right 
over.”65 Finally, the “low-hurry” condition text was: “It’ll be a few 
minutes before they’re ready for you, but you might as well head on over. 
If you have to wait over there, it shouldn’t be long.”66 The experiment then 
tested who of the subjects would stop along the path from one building to 
another to help a slumped “victim” planted in the alleyway, who would 
cough twice, groan, and if the subject stopped to ask if something was 
wrong, offer an explanation.67 
The study found that the variable on the assignment—to prepare a 
job-related talk as compared with a commentary on the Good Samaritan 
parable—made no significant difference in the decision to stop to offer 
help. Nor did the religious personality type. Instead, the most significant 
variable was the level of “hurry.” For the low-hurry group, 63% offered 
help; for the intermediate group, 45%; for the high-hurry group, 10%.68 
Darley and Batson query whether the subjects consciously noted the 
victim’s distress and consciously chose to leave him in distress. They muse 
whether another explanation is more apt: that the state of being in a hurry 
can generate a “narrowing of the cognitive map.”69 
Based on the subjects’ own reflections during the debriefing, Darley 
and Batson concluded that it may not be accurate to interpret the subjects’ 
responses as having seen the victim’s distress and having chosen to ignore 
it. Instead, they submit: “[B]ecause of the time pressures, they did not 
                                                     
 62. Id. at 102–03. 
 63. Id. at 103. 
 64. Id. at 103–04. 
 65. Id. at 104. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 102. 
 68. Id. at 105. 
 69. Id. at 107 (citing E.C. Tolman, Cognitive Maps in Rats and Men, 55 PSYCHOL. REV. 189, 
189–208 (1948)). 
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perceive the scene in the alley as an occasion for an ethical decision.”70 
Further, for the group of subjects that decided not to stop, Darley and 
Batson perceptively note that the hurrying was also related to the subjects’ 
desire to help the experimenter, who was “depending on him to get to a 
particular place quickly.”71 Thus the decision not to stop may not have 
been a matter of indifference, but instead because the subject “was in 
conflict between stopping to help the victim and continuing on his way to 
help the experimenter.”72 The study notes: “And this is often true of people 
in a hurry; they hurry because someone depends on their being 
somewhere. Conflict, rather than callousness, can explain their failure to 
stop.”73 
At first glance, the Darley–Batson experiment seems to be a gentle 
dig at religious folks: isn’t it interesting and ironic that it makes no 
difference that the subjects were instructed to give a talk—a process that 
presumably includes some reflection on content—on the story of the Good 
Samaritan? But on further reflection, the experiment, like the Parable 
itself, indicates openness and even a kind of gentleness, before the messy 
and conflicted reality of bystander decision-making. 
An interpretation of the Good Samaritan that emphasizes how the 
Samaritan was “moved from the gut” helps to avoid the trap of seeing the 
Parable as dictating exactly what to do in a particular situation. Instead, 
like Pope Francis’s interpretation of the Parable, the message is one kind 
of gut-level awareness of an existential bond with all other human beings, 
regardless of their condition, and especially in their need. Of course, the 
Parable is also a warning against the skewed sense of priorities that can 
lead to indifference to the needs of those we meet “on the road.” But this 
does not necessarily flatten out the interior decision-making process of 
bystanders as they sort through exactly what to do in a given situation or 
how to navigate conflicts between varying requests or demands to help 
others. 
III. STRANGERS DROWNING:  
ILLUMINATING THE CANONICAL “EASY RESCUE” CASES 
Previous Parts have explored two dimensions of the teachings of 
Pope Francis—on one hand, a strong critique of the globalization of 
                                                     
 70. Id. at 108. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 108; see also id. at 101 (“One can imagine the priest and the Levite, prominent public 
figures, hurrying along with little black books full of meetings and appointments, glancing furtively 
at their sundials. In contrast, the Samaritan would likely have far fewer and less important people 
counting on him to be at a particular place at a particular time, and therefore might be expected to be 
less in a hurry than the prominent priest of Levite.”). 
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indifference, and on the other, a deep appreciation for the interior life in 
which most people encounter their own limitations and weakness, 
notwithstanding a visceral sense of connection to others’ needs. This Part 
aims to illustrate what these tensions might reveal when brought into the 
analysis of the so-called “easy rescue” cases. 
The teachings of Pope Francis seem to compliment the critique of a 
bystander’s failure to perform an “easy rescue” in an extraordinary way. 
The shocking hypothetical is well known to torts students: a passerby who, 
with no danger to herself, could easily pull a drowning toddler from a 
wading pool, instead “pulls up a chair and looks on as [the toddler] 
perishes.”74 Does the passerby have any legal duty to help? In almost all 
jurisdictions in the United States, the answer is no.75 As leading torts 
commentator, William Prosser, graphically described, even an expert 
swimmer “who sees another drowning before his eyes, is not required to 
do anything at all about it, but may sit on the dock, smoke his cigarette and 
watch the man drown.”76 
Isn’t Pope Francis’s scathing Lampedusa indictment of how the 
world has stood by, watching countless strangers drown in the 
Mediterranean Sea, directly aligned with Prosser’s critique? The following 
lament seems to indicate the shared horror: 
                                                     
 74. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK 78 (1991). For the essay often credited for getting the 
discussion rolling in philosophy circles, see Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, 1 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 229, 231 (1972) (“[I]f I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, I 
ought to wade in and pull the child out. This will mean getting my clothes muddy, but this is 
insignificant, while the death of the child would presumably be a very bad thing.”). 
 75. A few states have amended their penal codes to include a statutory duty to rescue. See, e.g., 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 640A.01(1) (1996) (requiring reasonable assistance at the scene of an 
emergency); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-56-1 (1994) (same). In Massachusetts, bystanders are not 
required to provide assistance, but are required to report violent or sexual crimes to which they are a 
witness. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268, § 40 (West 1990) (“Whoever knows that another person is 
a victim of aggravated rape, murder, manslaughter or armed robbery and is at the scene of said crime 
shall, to the extent that said person can do so without danger or peril to himself or others, report said 
crime to an appropriate law enforcement official as soon as reasonably practicable.”); see also VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a) (West 1973) (“A person who knows that another is exposed to grave 
physical harm shall, to the extent that the same can be rendered without danger or peril to himself or 
without interference with important duties owed to others, give reasonable assistance to the exposed 
person unless that assistance or care is being provided by others.”). Similar statutes have been enacted 
in Florida, Hawaii, Washington, and Wisconsin. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.027 (West 1992); HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 663-1.6 (1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.69.100. (West 1998); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 940.34 (West 1996). California imposes a duty to report when the victim is a child. CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 152.3. Ohio imposes a general duty to report a felony. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22 (West 
1997); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 38 (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“When a statute 
requires an actor to act for the protection of another, the court may rely on the statute to decide that an 
affirmative duty exists and to determine the scope of the duty.”). See generally Eugene Volokh, Duty 
to Rescue/Report Statues, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 3, 2009, 12:24 AM), http://www.volokh.com/ 
2009/11/03/duty-to-rescuereport-statutes/ [https://perma.cc/WU47-CUFC]. 
 76. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 340 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter 
PROSSER 1971]. 
2017] Where Morality and the Law Coincide 1377 
Has any one of us grieved for the death of these brothers and sisters? 
Has any one of us wept for these persons who were on the boat? For 
the young mothers carrying their babies? For these men who were 
looking for a means of supporting their families? We are a society 
which has forgotten how to weep, how to experience  
compassion—“suffering with” others: the globalization of 
indifference has taken from us the ability to weep! . . . [L]et us ask 
the Lord for the grace to weep over our indifference, to weep over the 
cruelty of our world, of our own hearts, and of all those who in 
anonymity make social and economic decisions which open the door 
to tragic situations like this.77 
Mary Ann Glendon’s account of the canonical of no duty to rescue 
cases adds to the sense of outrage.78 She notes Buch v. Amory as the source 
of a particularly shocking explanation. The court wrote: 
I see my neighbor’s two-year-old babe in dangerous proximity to the 
machinery of his windmill in his yard, and easily might, but do not, 
rescue him. I am not liable in damages to the child for his 
injuries . . . because the child and I are strangers, and I am under no 
legal duty to protect him.79 
This gloss of a particularly extreme level of individualistic 
obliviousness to humanity and human need has helped to generate outrage 
and bewilderment in generations of commentators and citizens alike. For 
many law students, the discussion of these cases is an important moment 
in which they intuit what seems to be a vast and unbridgeable chasm 
between the law they are learning and the moral considerations of ordinary 
human beings. And here it would be tempting to add to the pile Pope 
Francis’s cutting critique of the globalization of indifference. 
But what happens when we bring into the discussion theological 
insights on the complexity of the interior life of bystanders? A first 
application might be astounding for its sheer simplicity. In these cases, the 
first result of a more full-bodied analysis of the interior life of bystanders 
is to note when bystanders were not even present. Attention to the 
humanity and decision-making process of bystanders helps to highlight the 
extent to which much of the legal analysis in this setting is grounded in a 
caricature of bystander action or inaction, and in a polarizing tendency to 
draw tidy lines between the righteous and the sinners. 
                                                     
 77. Lampedusa, supra note 12. 
 78. GLENDON, supra note 74, at 78. In hers and many other accounts, Osterlind v. Hill (1928), 
Handiboe v. McCarthy (1966), and Yania v. Bigan (1959), discussed below, are all cited as authority 
for the lack of a duty to rescue a drowning “stranger.” 
 79. Id. at 79 (citing Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 44 A. 809, 811 (N.H. 1897)). 
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A further result of this inquiry is to bring down, like a house of cards, 
the purportedly extreme tension between law and morality that the 
canonical no duty to rescue cases seem to pose. As it turns out, the 
common law of torts would leave much more room than expected for an 
analysis grounded in an ordinary person’s assessment of their moral 
obligations and, as explicated by Pope Francis, for the reasons of the heart. 
William Prosser was not the first to come up with the “drowning 
stranger” hypothetical. In an article published in 1908, incorporating and 
building on earlier cases and commentary, James Barr Ames set forth what 
are now two well-known, hypothetical “easy” rescue cases: 
 As I am walking over a bridge a man falls into the water. He 
cannot swim and calls for help. I am strong and a good swimmer, or, 
if you please, there is a rope on the bridge, and I might easily throw 
him an end and pull him ashore. I neither jump in nor throw him the 
rope, but see him drown. Or, again, I see a child on the railroad track 
too young to appreciate the danger of the approaching train. I might 
easily save the child, but do nothing, and the child, though it lives, 
loses both legs. Am I guilty of a crime and must I make compensation 
to the widow and children of the man drowned and to the wounded 
child?80 
Both of these examples are included in Prosser’s influential treatise 
on torts, as well as in the parallel explanations in the second Restatement 
of Torts. Both Prosser and the Restatement include in the notes cases that 
purport to stand as authority for the applicability of the no duty to rescue 
rule in such scenarios. But, when these narratives are compared with the 
actual facts of the cases, it is striking to see which details are not evident 
from the cases themselves. 
It is even more striking to note that it is precisely these details that 
tend to caricature the bystanders, in some cases turning them into what one 
court termed “moral monsters.”81 Precisely the aspects of the narratives 
that do so much work to depict the bystanders as coolly or cruelly 
indifferent emerge less from the facts of how people bungled their way 
through the tragic events that led to the victim’s injury, and more from 
judicial dicta and the imaginative minds of treatise writers. The sections 
below trace three examples of how Prosser’s sleight of hand has 
                                                     
 80. James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 112 (1908); see JEREMY 
BENTHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 292–93 (J. Burns & 
H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970); see also THANE ROSENBAUM, THE MYTH OF MORAL JUSTICE 264 (2004) 
(discussing a text from Maimonides’ Mishnah Torah interpreting the Leviticus 19:16 injunctive not to 
“stand idly by the blood of thy neighbor”). 
 81. For an early articulation of the “moral monster” image, see Buch, 44 A. at 810 (One who 
fails to aid “may, perhaps, justly be styled a ruthless savage and a moral monster; but he is not liable 
in damages . . . ”). 
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embellished the narrative—the drowning stranger; the child in the jaws of 
a machine; and the child in the pool. 
A. Not Sitting on the Dock, Not Close, and No Cigar 
The first edition of Prosser’s Handbook of the Law of Torts includes 
the following principle in its summary of the law of “Acts and Omissions”: 
“For an omission to act, there is no liability unless there is some definite 
relation between the parties which is regarded as imposing a duty to act.”82 
Further, “[t]he law has not recognized any general duty to aid a person 
who is in peril.”83 After explaining the early and still “deeply rooted” 
distinction between “active misconduct, working positive injury to others” 
(misfeasance) and “passive inaction, or a failure to take steps to protect 
them from harm” (nonfeasance),84 the discussion of “Duty to Aid One in 
Peril” provides a number of examples of the law’s reluctance to recognize 
“the moral obligation of common decency, to assist another human being 
who is in danger.”85 
The first example in the treatise is as follows: “The expert swimmer, 
with a boat [and a rope] at hand, who sees another drowning before his 
eyes, may sit on the dock, smoke his cigarette, and watch him drown.”86 
The authority cited for this example is a 1928 Massachusetts Supreme 
Court case, Osterlind v. Hill.87 The example and cited authority are 
repeated in all five versions of the treatise.88 
As Prosser was the Reporter for the 1965 Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, it is no surprise that the example also appears in § 314, “Duty to Act 
for Protection of Others:” “The fact that the actor realizes or should realize 
that action on his part is necessary for another’s aid or protection does not 
of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action.”89 The explanation’s 
language and tone closely track Prosser’s, with the preference for a cigar 
over a cigarette: 
                                                     
 82. WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, ch. 5, § 32b, at 190 (1941) 
[hereinafter PROSSER 1941]. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 191 (citing Francis H. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort 
Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 217, 219 (1908)). 
 85. Id. at 192. 
 86. Id. (citing Osterlind v. Hill, 160 N.E. 301 (Mass. 1928)). 
 87. Hill, 160 N.E. 301. 
 88. WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, ch. 6, § 38, at 184 (2d ed. 1955) 
[hereinafter PROSSER 1955]; WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, ch. 10, § 54, at 
336 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter PROSSER 1964]; PROSSER 1971, supra note 76, at 340; W. PAGE 
KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW 
OF TORTS, ch. 9, § 56, at 375 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON 1984]. The “rope at 
hand” detail is included beginning with the third edition. 
 89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965). 
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The result of the rule has been a series of older decisions to the effect 
that one human being, seeing a fellow man in dire peril, is under no 
legal obligation to aid him, but may sit on the dock, smoke his cigar, 
and watch the other drown. Such decisions have been condemned by 
legal writers as revolting to any moral sense, but thus far they remain 
the law. It appears inevitable that, sooner or later such extreme cases 
of morally outrageous and indefensible conduct will arise that there 
will be further inroads upon the older rule.90 
However, without severe distortion of the case, neither the holding 
nor the facts of Osterlind can be read as support for Prosser’s point. 
According to the declaration, in the early morning of July 4, 1925, 
Osterlind and Ryan, both intoxicated, visited a business that rented 
pleasure boats and canoes to be used on Lake Quannapowitt in Wakefield, 
Massachusetts. The pair rented a canoe and went out on the lake. Shortly 
thereafter, the canoe capsized and Osterlind hung on to the overturned 
canoe “making loud calls for assistance, which calls the defendant [boat 
owner] heard and utterly ignored.”91 After about half an hour, Osterlind 
released his grip and drowned. The declaration does not indicate what 
happened to Ryan. Osterlind’s estate sued the owner of the boat, and the 
issue before the court was not a purported duty to rescue but a statutory 
obligation to have “a reasonable regard for the safety of the persons to 
whom he let boats and canoes.”92 
When Osterlind is read through the lens of the duty to rescue—an 
issue that was not before the court—it might seem that the case stands for 
a kind of glorification of rugged individualism. The court’s discussion of 
Black v. New York Railroad, a case describing the duty owed to a local 
train passenger who was so intoxicated “as to be incapable of standing or 
walking or caring for himself in any way,”93 could be interpreted as asking, 
“how drunk do you have to be before someone is required to help you?” 
Further, one might also extrapolate that a legal duty to rescue was not 
required based on an assumption that an able-bodied man can care for 
himself: anyone who was in a good enough condition to hang on to the 
                                                     
 90. Id. § 314 cmt. c. The details of the Restatement illustration for comment c further capture the 
sense of moral outrage. See id. cmt. c, illus. 1 (“A sees B, a blind man, about to step into the street in 
front of an approaching automobile. A could prevent B from so doing by a word or touch without 
delaying his own progress. A does not do so, and B is run over and hurt. A is under no duty to prevent 
B from stepping into the street, and is not liable to B.”). For a careful analysis of the extent to which 
case law supports this section of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, see two articles by Peter F. Lake, 
Recognizing the Importance of Remoteness to the Duty to Rescue, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 315 (1997) and 
Bad Boys, Bad Men, and Bad Case Law: Re-Examining the Historical Foundations of No-Duty-to-
Rescue Rules, 43 N.Y. L. SCH. REV. 385 (1999). 
 91. Osterlind, 160 N.E. at 302. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. (citing Black v. New York R.R., 79 N.E. 797 (Mass. 1907)). 
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canoe for half an hour and shout for help did not really require assistance.94 
And it seems brutally callous for the court to conclude that the failure of 
the defendant to respond to the plaintiff’s cries for help was 
“immaterial.”95 
In contrast, when the opinion is read through the lens of the issue that 
actually was before the court, what would now be termed negligent 
entrustment—whether the boat owner had reasonable regard for the safety 
of the person to whom he rented the canoe, given the manifest conditions 
of impairment at the time of the rental transaction—then the court’s focus 
and language make sense. As distinguished from the condition of the 
plaintiff in Black, the Osterlind court found that the plaintiff was not 
helpless—as it turned out, he was in good enough condition to hang on to 
a canoe for half an hour and had the wherewithal to shout for help. The 
case turned not on the defendant’s failure to act once Osterlind was out on 
the lake but on the initial judgment of whether to rent a canoe to a person 
in light of how he presented himself at the time of the rental transaction. 
Second, the facts hardly support Prosser’s point. Recall that 
Osterlind is cited as authority for the principle that “the expert swimmer, 
with a boat and a rope at hand, who sees another drowning before his eyes, 
is not required to do anything at all about it, but may sit on the dock, smoke 
his cigarette, and watch the man drown.”96 Because rescue was not 
precisely at issue in the case, there was no discussion of the physical 
position of the boat owner or boathouse employee relative to the plaintiff 
in distress. For example, in the declaration the plaintiff alleged that the 
defendant could hear Osterlind’s shouts, but there is no indication that the 
owner or employee was on a dock, was watching the incident, or was close 
enough to throw him a rope. Nor was there any indication that in those 
undoubtedly dark early morning hours97 the defendant was able to see 
Osterlind at all.98 And there was certainly no indication of anyone calmly 
smoking a cigar (or cigarette, or pipe) while a fellow human being was 
drowning. Neither does the case indicate how far out the canoe had drifted, 
what happened to Osterlind’s friend, Ryan, and why Ryan did not help. 
                                                     
 94. See Philip W. Romohr, A Right/Duty Perspective on the Legal and Philosophical 
Foundations of the No-Duty to Rescue Rule, 55 DUKE L.J. 1025, 1029 n.23 (distinguishing the facts 
as follows: “After renting the canoe, the defendant apparently listened to the deceased’s screams for 
help for half an hour and did nothing. In fact, the court found the deceased’s ability to hang on to the 
canoe for that long indicated that he was not truly helpless.”). 
 95. Osterlind, 160 N.E. at 302. 
 96. PROSSER 1971, supra note 76, at 340. 
 97. Sunrise in Massachusetts for early July is about 5:13 AM. See Sunrise and Sunset in Boston, 
TIMEANDDATE.COM, http://www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/astronomy.html?n=43&month= 
7&year=2014&obj=sun&afl=-11&day=. 
 98. See generally Osterlind, 160 N.E. 301. 
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The 1925 report for the town of Wakefield indicates only one death on 
July 4, 1925, that of Osterlind.99 
Probing the question of whether the owner would have been able to 
hear Osterlind’s shouts from a distance, a picture taken in the 1930s of 
Hill’s Boathouse in Wakefield, Massachusetts, depicts a fairly large 
structure that includes not only boat rental facilities but also a dance hall 
on the upper floor.100 Historical accounts indicate that the Boathouse was 
the center of town life from 1887 through 1963.101 One inventory indicates 
that in the mid-1920s, Hill’s boat rental business was not a small 
operation—more than 120 boats were available for rent.102 The wee hours 
of Saturday, July 4, 1925, would have been the beginning of a holiday 
weekend. This may give some indication that even very late that evening 
the owner or employees may have been too busy to keep track of 
individual customers who ventured out onto the lake. Further, given that 
the most popular central dance hall in town was located on the floor above 
the boat rental space, it is not inconceivable that employees would have 
been unable to hear or distinguish Osterlind’s shouts, regardless of how 
close he was to the shore. 
In sum, on the facts, Osterlind includes no details indicating that the 
boat owner or the owner’s agent was in a physical position to perform an 
“easy” rescue. Nor does the case include any indication of the details that 
have been so effective for turning the canoe renter into a callous and 
indifferent moral monster. Prosser’s lampoon of a callous and gawking 
bystander obfuscates not only more thoughtful and nuanced discussions of 
the contours of affirmative obligations but also the broader and more 
structural considerations of the factors that were relevant to the  
canoe-renter’s decision-making process in this case, including the extent 
to which one person should be responsible for the decisions or safety of 
another adult who is intoxicated and how to determine legal responsibility 
                                                     
 99. See Annual Report of the Town Officers of Wakefield Massachusetts (1925), 
http://archive.org/stream/annualreportofto1925wake/annualreportofto1925wake_djvu.txt 
[https://perma.cc/KWC4-TYXP]. 
 100. The cover of a Lake Quannapowitt picture book features Hill’s Boat House and Dance Hall 
with a large sign that reads “Dancing Every Saturday Night.” From the picture one might also intuit 
the extent to which the lower boat rental part of the structure may have been impacted by the noise 
level of the upper level dance hall. See ALISON C. SIMCOX & DOUGLAS L. HEATH, LAKE 
QUANNAPOWITT (2011); see also Jayne M. D’Onofrio, Hill’s Boathouse, circa 1930’s, NOBLE 
Digital Heritage, Item #12056 (1933), http://heritage.noblenet.org/items/show/12056 [https:// 
perma.cc/5PGV-5R6J]. 
 101. Records indicate that the dance hall was added to the structure in 1912 and was in operation 
as a dance hall through the 1960s. See Nancy Bertrand, History: The Boathouse, Early Center of Life 
in Wakefield, WAKEFIELD PATCH (Sept. 6, 2011), http://wakefield.patch.com/groups/opinion/p/ 
history-the-boathouse-early-center-of-life-in-wakefield [https://perma.cc/82Z5-BKPJ]. 
 102. See D’Onofrio, supra note 100 (describing the inventory of the boat rental operation, 
including more than 100 canoes and more than twenty public rowboats). 
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for the point of intervention when intoxication levels are not always 
immediately evident. 
B. In the Jaws of a Machine: Due (in Part) to a Language Barrier 
In a second example, Prosser notes that one is under no duty “to cry 
warning to one who is walking into the jaws of a dangerous machine,”103 
citing, among other cases, Buch v. Amory.104 The opinion by the Chief 
Justice of the New Hampshire Supreme Court is thick with dicta that have 
become the stuff of moral monster legends in the no-duty-to-rescue 
literature. The court made an explicit link to the Good Samaritan story, 
drawing a sharp distinction between law and morality: 
Actionable negligence is the neglect of a legal duty. The defendants 
are not liable unless they owed to the plaintiff a legal duty which they 
neglected to perform. With purely moral obligations the law does not 
deal. For example, the priest and Levite who passed by on the other 
side were not, it is supposed, liable at law for the continued suffering 
of the man who fell among thieves, which they might, and morally 
ought to have, prevented or relieved.105 
The court used an example of a baby on the railroad track as a 
particularly dramatic illustration: 
Suppose A., standing close by a railroad, sees a two year old babe on 
the track, and a car approaching. He can easily rescue the child, with 
entire safety to himself, and the instincts of humanity require him to 
do so. If he does not, he may, perhaps, justly be styled a ruthless 
savage and a moral monster; but he is not liable in damages for the 
child’s injury, or indictable under the statute for its death.106 
In explaining the “wide difference” between causing and preventing 
an injury, the court returns to the two-year-old babe, this time, the child of 
his neighbor “in dangerous proximity to the machinery of his windmill in 
his yard, and easily might, but do not, rescue him. I am not liable in 
damages to the child for his injuries . . . because the child and I are 
strangers, and I am under no legal duty to protect him.”107 The court 
continues: 
                                                     
 103. PROSSER 1941, supra note 82, at 192; PROSSER 1955, supra note 88; PROSSER 1964, supra 
note 88; PROSSER 1971, supra note 76, at 341; PROSSER & KEETON 1984, supra note 88. 
 104. See generally Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 44 A. 809 (N.H. Sup. Ct. 1897). 
 105. Id. at 810. See generally Luke 10:30–37, for the Good Samaritan Parable, with references 
to the passing priest and Levite. 
 106. Buch, 44 A. at 810. 
 107. Id. at 811. 
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Now, suppose I see the same child trespassing in my own yard, and 
meddling in like manner with dangerous machinery of my own 
windmill. What additional obligation is cast upon me by reason of the 
child’s trespass? The mere fact that the child is unable to take care of 
himself does not impose on me the legal duty of protecting him in the 
one case more than in the other. Upon what principle of law can an 
infant, by coming unlawfully upon my premises, impose upon me the 
legal duty of a guardian? None has been suggested, and we know of 
none.108 
Standing alone, these illustrations do have an extreme quality. But 
the actual facts of the case are hardly an example of indifference. The child 
in question was not two but eight, the brother of a thirteen-year-old 
employee in the mule-spinning room of a mill. While there was evidence 
that other boys had brought their younger brothers to the factory, there was 
no evidence in the record that the employer knew this. The court noted that 
about two hours before the accident, the overseer in charge of the other 
boys became aware that the eight-year-old boy was not an employee and 
directed him to leave. “[T]hinking he might not understand English, [he] 
took him to an operative who spoke the plaintiff’s language, whom he told 
to send the plaintiff out.”109 It seems that the boy either did not understand 
or did not follow the directive. Subsequently, his hand became caught in a 
gearing that the other boys had been instructed to avoid.110 
When the dicta are compared with the facts, the actual case includes 
neither a baby nor a direct awareness on the part of the employer that a 
child was “walking into the jaws of a dangerous machine.”111 The facts do 
indicate some effort to remove the boy from danger and that the tragic 
bungle was at least in part a failure to communicate effectively due to a 
language barrier. As the court summarized, the negligence charged to the 
employer was that “inasmuch as they could not make the plaintiff 
understand a command to leave the premises, and ought to have known 
that they could not, they did not forcibly eject him.”112 
The image of Buch that remains fixed in our legal–cultural 
imagination is that of a law that remains callous and indifferent to a 
bystander watching a baby crawl into a machine. In reality, like in 
Osterlind, the facts of Buch include no reference to a bystander–witness 
coolly watching the accident unfold before his eyes. 
                                                     
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 809. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See supra note 103. 
 112. Buch, 44 A. at 810. 
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C. Swimming Pool Tragedy: Failure to Lock the Door to the Yard 
In the 1971 fourth edition of Prosser’s treatise, Handiboe v. 
McCarthy113 is included in the footnote with Osterlind as further authority 
for the idea that the expert swimmer is not required to do anything as a 
man drowns before his eyes. The summary notes that in Handiboe “it was 
held that there was no duty whatever to rescue a child licensee drowning 
in a swimming pool.”114 Handiboe does involve a small child and a 
swimming pool, but it is not a failure to rescue case, at least not in the 
sense of fitting into this line of hypotheticals. In Handiboe, the plaintiff’s 
four-year-old son had been a frequent visitor to the defendant’s home to 
play with the defendant’s son of the same age. The housekeeper was the 
only adult at home at the time of the accident. On the day of the accident, 
a door had been left unlocked, giving the children access to an enclosed 
yard with a swimming pool. The deep end of the pool contained about 
three feet of water, together with a slippery and slimy “accumulation of 
leaves, moss, and other trash and scum.”115 When the little boy fell into 
the pool, he was unable to pull himself up because of the slippery 
condition.116 
The case is very sad, but not an example of cruel indifference. The 
tragic consequences were the result of a careless person leaving a door 
unlocked. One might sustain a strong critique of the court’s reasoning and 
the extent to which adult supervision should have informed the neighbor’s 
duty of care to the child. But this is hardly a case in which a bystander 
stood by doing nothing, watching a child drown. In fact, based on the facts 
as recounted in the case, there were no witnesses at all. 
D. Healing the Perceived Tension Between Law and Morality 
Why fuss over these seemingly tiny factual disputes regarding the 
depiction of bystanders? There are two reasons to correct the record. First, 
the framework depicting bystanders as “moral monsters” has caused 
enormous damage, convincing legions of law students and lawyers that it 
is difficult to reconcile their ordinary moral instincts and their study of the 
law. Second, the hyperbolic tendencies to create moral monsters distract 
from the harder work required to identify and resolve the more complex 
sources of injustice. 
Regarding the first, of course if the image of a baby drowning in a 
wading pool did not catch our attention, something would be awry. As a 
                                                     
 113. Handiboe v. McCarthy, 151 S.E.2d 905 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966). 
 114. PROSSER 1971, supra note 76, ch. 9, § 56 at 340 n.60; PROSSER & KEETON 1984, supra note 
88, ch. 9, § 56 at 375 n.22. 
 115. Handiboe, 151 S.E.2d at 907. 
 116. Id. 
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teaching tool, this hypothetical is precisely designed to attract students’ 
attention and to help them learn to think with their heads, even when the 
example pulls on their heartstrings. But a certain habit of referring to 
hypotheticals located at the extreme edges of reality may also be grounded 
in a sense that becoming a lawyer entails entry into a mindset and way of 
being that is different from that of people who are not lawyers. 
One student’s reflections on the varying responses of first year law 
students and their visiting family members during a “Family Day” mock 
torts class discussion of Osterlind draws out the contrast: 
My father came to visit and we sat in on a first year torts class. The 
Osterlind case was discussed and I remember distinctly that this case 
more than any other drew perplexed questions from visiting family 
members. The visitors just could not understand how the defendant 
was not culpable in some way. The professor teaching the class had 
several students planted in the room upon whom he called to discuss 
the case and they rattled off the legal theory without missing a beat. 
The rest of the law students present, myself included, nodded in 
agreement and felt proud that we could follow this logic. We had 
learned a lot during that first year. We were thinking like  
lawyers—something that our families could not do.117 
Some students do not nod in agreement or feel proud. Instead, they 
feel confused and maybe even horrified or sickened. For some, discussion 
of the no-duty-to-rescue cases is a moment they realize, to quote Carole 
King, that “something inside has died.”118 They detect within themselves 
a kind of fissure between what they perceive as the technical, partisan, 
even “hired gun” mentality of the legal profession, and their sense of duty 
and respect for other human beings grounded in ordinary morality and 
common sense. The student goes on to engage these concerns: 
We hear that expression a lot—think like a lawyer. That’s our goal in 
law school. However, cases like Osterlind demonstrate that thinking 
like a lawyer means thinking the polar opposite of what we were 
raised to think and what the rest of society thinks. It means 
disregarding the moral compass that guides all of society. If that’s the 
case—then why should we want to think like lawyers?119 
Some students fight back. The no-duty-to-rescue examples provoke 
a kind of rebellion against the normative rule—the law must be wrong, it 
should be changed. As one student from an earlier generation described 
                                                     
 117. Corina Bogaciu, Thinking Like a Lawyer, FORDHAM FORUM ON L., CULTURE, & SOC’Y 
BLOG (Dec. 20, 2008, 7:17 PM), http://www.forumonlawcultureandsociety.org/2008/12/20/thinking-
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 118. See CAROLE KING, IT’S TOO LATE (Tapestry 1971). 
 119. Bogaciu, supra note 117. 
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her torts class discussion of Osterlind and Handiboe: “there was a visible 
reaction of horror to these unsavory cases. Our moral sensibilities were 
deeply offended. Almost instinctively we turned to the legal system. 
‘There ought to be a law,’ we cried.”120 
How might attention to the interior life of bystanders, as illuminated 
by Pope Francis’s complex reflection on the moving parts of this problem, 
help to heal the perceived tension between responses grounded in ordinary 
morality and this common law tort rule? Pope Francis’s account of mercy 
manages to hold together two points in seeming contrast: on one hand, a 
strong critique of a culture of indifference, and on the other, a capacity to 
understand and even embrace the limitations that people may experience 
when they encounter pain and violence. Perhaps it is precisely the capacity 
to hold together these contrasts that may shed light on a more humane and 
more realistic assessment of bystander obligations. 
It may also illuminate the process of learning how to “think like a 
lawyer.” For example, holding these elements together might also help 
foster students’ appreciation for the complexities of such situations that 
inform the real-life questions about bystander response to emergencies. 
“Thinking like a lawyer” should include developing the complex 
categories needed to understand and work with the facts of real-life 
situations and actual cases, not just streamlined hypotheticals. 
Further, the exercise of learning to “think like a lawyer” should also 
include attention to the interior life of real people that one encounters in 
the process of learning about the legal system—whether through a case 
account, a newspaper story, or a client in a clinic. In some of the cases in 
the classic torts canon, actual human beings have suffered a loss, been 
subjected to violence, or witnessed something traumatic. Some of the 
bystanders were distracted, tongue-tied, or extremely fearful, and for good 
reason. Others were paralyzed by pressure or loyalty. “Thinking like a 
lawyer” includes the capacity to perceive all of the ways in which 
circumstances and subjective perspectives inform how people act and react 
and the decisions that they make. 
If the extreme “moral monster” hypotheticals are not grounded in the 
facts of the cases and if they actually obfuscate many important tort law 
questions, then there is no need to wield them in a way that only serves to 
confuse law students. Instead of accentuating a fissure between a student’s 
understanding of the law and ordinary morality, these hypotheticals should 
call for ordinary morality to kick in as a support to the exercise of critical 
analytical skills. 
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Regarding the second reason, the extent to which “moral monster” 
hypotheticals distract from the more difficult analysis of sources of 
injustice, “thinking like a lawyer” should also include the invitation to 
think structurally about the extent to which the law, or which aspects of 
the law, may or may not be the right instrument to address difficult moral 
problems. A host of structural and institutional questions pervade the 
seemingly “easy” rescue cases. Especially when violence is involved, 
complex social, personal, and psychological factors necessarily inform 
how bystanders engage the scene, making it very difficult to articulate a 
clear pattern of obligatory conduct. Some encounters between bystanders 
and victims may indicate something like moral monstrosity on the part of 
a witness—but these are hardly “easy” cases.121 
Once the mythical moral monsters are dismissed from the classroom, 
the passionate anger that can rise in the face of injustice can be channeled 
toward the investigation of these subtler subjective, relational, and 
structural problems. It is to this dimension that Part IV now turns. 
IV. THE GOOD SAMARITAN IS NOT ENOUGH:  
ATTENTION TO STRUCTURES 
A. Battling the Frameworks that Produce Robbers and Victims 
A further layer of Pope Francis’s reflections to consider is his 
assessment of when the Good Samaritan is “not enough.” Particularly 
when engaging interdisciplinary projects at the nexus between theological 
reflection and business models, the Pope has exhorted participants to pay 
close attention to the deeper and more structural questions that may 
permeate the incidents and contexts that lead to accidents, violence, or 
other forms of injury. Drawing on a pervasive theme in Catholic social 
thought across the decades,122 the Pope explains that the problem with a 
myopic focus on individual action is that it may obfuscate the occasions 
when the root of our most difficult problems should also be attributed to 
structures and systems that foster injustice. 
                                                     
 121. See generally Uelmen, Crime Spectators, supra note 2 (discussing the mythical aspects of 
how bystanders to the Kitty Genovese murder were depicted and suggesting elements to distinguish 
fearful or distracted bystanders from “engaged spectators” who are, in a certain sense, participants in 
the violence). 
 122. See, e.g., John Paul II, Sollicitudo rei socialis (On Social Concerns) paras.  
36–39 (1987), http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_ 
30121987_sollicitudo-rei-socialis.html [http://perma.cc/MMV3-42Q9] (discussing the theological 
concept of “structures of sin”). 
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For example, in an address to participants in the “Economy of 
Communion” project,123 Pope Francis explored how a business project 
dedicated to combatting poverty must pay attention to how this work is 
embedded in social and legal systems that tend to “produce” marginalized 
and “discarded” people: 
But—and this can never be said enough—capitalism continues to 
produce discarded people whom it would then like to care for. The 
principal ethical dilemma of this capitalism is the creation of 
discarded people, then trying to hide them or make sure they are no 
longer seen. A serious form of poverty in a civilization is when it is 
no longer able to see its poor, who are first discarded and then 
hidden.124 
Note the Pope’s deep skepticism regarding efforts to repair human and 
environmental damage with “credits” or other kinds of financial 
contributions. 
Aircraft pollute the atmosphere, but, with a small part of the cost of 
the ticket, they will plant trees to compensate for part of the damage 
created. Gambling companies finance campaigns to care for the 
pathological gamblers that they create. And the day that the weapons 
industry finances hospitals to care for the children mutilated by their 
bombs, the system will have reached its pinnacle. This is 
hypocrisy!125 
What might it mean to explore a vision of justice that pushes beyond 
individual attention to those who are “discarded”? Here too, the Pope is 
deeply skeptical about some forms of utilitarian cost–benefit analysis, and 
he challenges the Project to keep its horizons broad: 
[The project] must not only care for the victims, but build a system 
where there are ever fewer victims, where, possibly, there may no 
longer be any. As long as the economy still produces one victim and 
                                                     
 123. Economy of Communion, supra note 5. Pope Francis began the address by probing the 
potentially oxymoronic quality of the project’s name, and in so doing he also gave a synopsis of its 
work: Economy and communion. These are two words that contemporary culture keeps separate and 
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Lubich offered you 25 years ago in Brazil, when, in the face of the scandal of inequality in the city of 
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demonstrate that economy and communion become more beautiful when they are beside each other.” 
See generally Luigino Bruni & Amelia J. Uelmen, Religious Values and Corporate Decision Making: 
The Economy of Communion Project, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 645, 662–65 (2006) (describing 
the project and providing a sketch of insights applicable to economic and legal theory). 
 124. Economy of Communion, supra note 5. 
 125. Id. 
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there is still a single discarded person, communion has not yet been 
realized; the celebration of universal fraternity is not full. 126 
The bar is high: lack of attention to “a single discarded person” indicates 
that we have work to do. He then refers to the Parable of the Good 
Samaritan, but notes the need to go beyond this story: 
[W]e must work toward changing the rules of the game of the socio-
economic system. Imitating the Good Samaritan of the Gospel is not 
enough. Of course, when an entrepreneur or any person happens upon 
a victim, he or she is called to take care of the victim and, perhaps 
like the Good Samaritan, also to enlist the fraternal action of the 
market (the innkeeper). . . . But it is important to act above all before 
the man comes across the robbers, by battling the frameworks of sin 
that produce robbers and victims. An entrepreneur who is only a 
Good Samaritan does half of his duty: he takes care of today’s 
victims, but does not curtail those of tomorrow. 127 
By analogy, one might argue that in the interdisciplinary 
conversation about the obligations of bystanders, a legal theorist who pays 
attention only to the moral exhortations for individuals to pierce the “soap 
bubbles”128 that isolate them from attention to their neighbor’s needs also 
only does half of her duty. It is with this critical eye that this Part now 
turns to an analysis of two additional canonical no-duty-to-rescue cases. 
B. The Railroad Cases: The Duties of Landowners, Not Bystanders 
The cases discussed in Part III reveal a gap between the facts of the 
cases and the explanatory narratives drawn out by courts or treatise 
authors. In contrast, the “easy rescue” railroad cases present a different 
framework:129 railroad owners and employees are not mere bystanders, 
they are landowners or agents of landowners who are dealing with 
trespassers. In the leading case, Union Pacific Railway v. Cappier, a 
trespasser on a railroad track was struck and injured by a moving train, 
through no fault of the railroad.130 Suit was brought for failure to assist the 
injured, bleeding trespasser. 
If the injured person had been a passenger, such would have 
constituted the kind of “special relationship” between passenger and 
carrier, triggering a duty of care. The usual course of action in these 
                                                     
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See Lampedusa, supra note 12. 
 129. See generally Harold F. McNiece & John V. Thornton, Affirmative Duties in Tort, 58 YALE 
L.J. 1272, 1279–80 (1949); Sam B. Warner, Duty of a Railway Company to Care for a Person It Has 
Without Fault Rendered Helpless, 7 CALIF. L. REV. 312 (1919). 
 130. Union Pac. Ry. v. Cappier, 72 P. 281, 282 (Kan. 1903). 
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situations would have been for the crew to take charge of the hurt person, 
render first aid, and get the injured passenger to a hospital or under a 
doctor’s care.131 This duty did not extend to trespassers. The court 
explained: 
[T]he duty [to aid] must be owing from the defendant to the plaintiff, 
otherwise there can be no negligence . . . . And the duty must be 
owing to plaintiff in an individual capacity, and not merely as one of 
the general public. This excludes from actionable negligence all 
failures to observe the obligations imposed by charity, gratitude, 
generosity, and the kindred virtues.132 
Like Buch discussed above, Cappier is also infamous for its 
extremely broad dicta drawing sharp lines between moral and legal 
obligations. 
With the humane side of the question courts are not concerned. It is 
the omission or negligent discharge of legal duties only which come 
within the sphere of judicial cognizance. For withholding relief from 
the suffering, for failure to respond to the calls of worthy charity, or 
for faltering in the bestowment of brotherly love on the unfortunate, 
penalties are found not in the laws of men, but in that higher law, the 
violation of which is condemned by the voice of conscience, whose 
sentence of punishment for the recreant act is swift and sure.133 
This language—not the holding, and not even the principle that 
landowners should not be legally responsible for assisting trespassers who 
have been injured through no fault of the railroad—has been the source of 
harsh criticism in the literature. As John Scheid lamented: “The court’s 
attitude is one of consummate individualism, and the case is a perfect 
example of its excesses.”134 
As noted above, in all of these cases, railroad owners and employees 
are not mere bystanders, they are landowners or agents of landowners who 
are dealing with trespassers. And in all likelihood the reason that the 
railroad employees did not assist trespassers injured on the tracks was 
                                                     
 131. Charles O. Gregory, Gratuitous Undertakings and the Duty of Care, 1 DEPAUL L. REV. 30, 
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 132. Cappier, 72 P. at 283 (emphasis added); see also Adams v. Southern Ry. Co., 34 S.E. 642 
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because of a company policy regarding injured trespassers. Certainly 
railroad employees could be critiqued for their failure to challenge the 
inhumane consequences of company policy.135 But, as Harper and James 
note, the railway cases are not exactly analogous to the relationship 
between a bystander and a baby in a pool, “where there is no antecedent 
relationship between the parties and defendant has done nothing to create 
the risk.”136 
In contrast, they submit that these cases seem to call for a more 
structural, institutional response: “As we have seen, there is growing belief 
that the beneficiaries of an enterprise which creates risks should pay for 
the casualties it inflicts without regard to fault.”137 Either way, like the 
other canonical rescue cases discussed above, the railroad cases shed little 
light on the decision-making process of bystanders. 
C. When the “Bystander” Is a Bully 
Similarly, and as noted above, seemingly “easy” rescue cases that 
involve the bystander as a witness—and perhaps also as a participant—in 
some form of violence also beg deeper social, psychological, and 
structural questions.138 Of all of the canonical “easy rescue” cases, Yania 
v. Bigan139 seems to most closely track the cool indifference of the expert 
swimmer watching someone drown. According to the complaint, John 
Bigan and Joseph Yania were both operators of coal strip-mining 
operations in Pennsylvania. Together with another man, Boyd Ross, Yania 
came onto Bigan’s property in order to discuss a business matter. While 
they were there, Bigan asked them to help him get a pump started. The 
pump was submerged in a large trench that had been cut for the purpose 
of removing the coal underneath. The water was about eight to ten feet 
deep. The complaint alleges that while Yania was standing at the edge of 
the trench, Bigan and Ross were “urging, enticing, taunting and 
inveigling” him to jump into the water.140 Yania jumped and subsequently 
drowned. The complaint alleged that Bigan failed to take reasonable steps 
to assist him.141 
Taking the allegations in the complaints to be true, the appellate court 
acknowledged that had Yania been “a child of tender years or a person 
mentally deficient then it is conceivable that taunting and enticement could 
                                                     
 135. Note that the harsh impact of these policies would be mitigated over time also due to 
changes in tort doctrine. See Gregory, supra note 131, at 43. See generally Warner, supra note 129. 
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 138. See generally Uelmen, Crime Spectators, supra note 2. 
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constitute actionable negligence if it resulted in harm.”142 But when he 
“undertook to perform an act which he knew or should have known was 
attended with more or less peril,”143 he was an adult in full possession of 
all his mental faculties. His own action, not Bigan’s conduct, was held to 
be the cause of his “unfortunate death.”144 Bigan is one of the few actual 
onlookers in the canonical cases, and the descriptions of his conduct, at 
least as described in the complaint, may actually provide the most insight 
into his intentions and his decision-making process. 
But this is precisely why this case is also a misnomer—not only for 
the duty-to-rescue discussion but also for a discussion regarding the moral 
and legal obligations of bystanders. Bigan was hardly a bystander. On the 
contrary, the facts indicate that Bigan was very involved and perhaps best 
characterized as a bully, actively contributing to the risk that ultimately 
led to Yania’s demise.145 Thus, this does not answer the question of 
whether Yania’s choices, made as a competent adult, would have 
eviscerated that contributing factor. But regardless, neither the case nor 
the commentary provides a good model for a discussion of the legal and 
moral obligations of bystanders. 
D. Proceeding to the More Difficult Questions 
As discussed above, when these canonical no-duty to rescue classics 
are examined carefully, it turns out that none of the facts turn on the failure 
of bystanders to assist a victim in need of emergency assistance. Instead, 
they are more about—forgive the pun—run-of-the-mill questions 
regarding the care owed to those who do not seem to fit well within the 
neat categories of duties derived from clear and specific relational ties: a 
neighbor’s child when there is no clear arrangement for supervision; a 
younger sibling of a teenage employee who was not supposed to be on the 
factory premises; a trespasser on the train tracks; and a person with whom 
one had just engaged in a business transaction. The more shocking details 
about the moral and legal obligations of bystanders emerge not from the 
cases themselves, but from judicial dicta and the embellishing 
imagination—and at times the sleight of hand—of journal and treatise 
authors. 
What follows from these observations? This is not to say that the 
dicta in these cases are unimportant or should be disregarded. The 
language in the cases and the various versions of Prosser’s treatise are 
significant texts that have exerted powerful influence on legal and cultural 
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narratives over the course of the twentieth century, and they should be 
analyzed as such. At the same time, it is also helpful to acknowledge the 
extent to which these mischaracterizations and caricatures of the actions 
and decision-making process of seeming “bystanders” in these cases have 
exerted a broad and powerful influence over our common law discussion 
of bystanders. When perceptions of bystander behavior are disassociated 
from these distortions, we may be able to grapple with the more difficult 
questions regarding bystander decision-making that lurk just beneath the 
surface. 
For example, some of the previously discussed cases involve serious 
tensions between the principle of beneficence and the principle that 
competent adults should take responsibility for their own actions. To make 
matters more complex, these tensions arise when one considers the 
responsibilities of third parties who were not in a clearly defined 
relationship of legal responsibility with the injured party. To illustrate, the 
harder question at the heart of Osterlind was the extent to which renters 
should be held responsible for assessing the “manifest impairment” of 
their customers before renting out the vehicle or boat. The harder question 
at the heart of Handiboe was how to allot responsibility for accidents that 
emerge when arrangements for the supervision of children are only tacit. 
The harder question at the heart of Yania was how the law should analyze 
the relational complexity of bullying between otherwise competent adults. 
All of these questions are difficult, and to reduce to caricature the  
decision-making process of the actors who were actually present yields 
nothing for a serious effort to solve these problems.146 
Of course, as Pope Francis also emphasizes, callous indifference to 
the suffering of another human being is bad—bad for victims, bad for 
witnesses, and bad for society. But we must also be on the lookout for the 
danger of, as Pope Francis describes, “simplistic analyses that fail to grasp 
the complexity of problems.”147 Here too, refraining from drawing tidy 
lines between the righteous and the sinners can help to open the space we 
need to explore more complex and more difficult questions within legal 
theory that pervade both individual and structural decision-making. 
V. FREEDOM AND OTHER-REGARDING OBLIGATIONS 
One way to engage the complexity of the duty-to-rescue discourse is 
to acknowledge how it might be difficult to find a common language to 
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bridge the differences between libertarian legal discourse and discourse 
grounded in Catholic moral theology.148 After setting out how this tension 
in diverse accounts of whether conscription of the assistance of an 
otherwise uninvolved bystander would be an incursion on the bystander’s 
freedom, this Part proceeds to consider how the work of two legal theorists 
might step in to fill the gap. 
A. Libertarian Concerns About Other-Regarding Obligations 
The Restatement (Third) of Torts Section 37 sets out some of the 
philosophical foundations for the arguments for a general rule against 
affirmative obligations. These rules also ground concerns regarding 
bystander obligations more generally. One comment to this Restatement 
section surmises that the requirement of affirmative conduct “in turn relies 
on the liberal tradition of individual freedom and autonomy. Classical 
liberalism is wary of laws that regulate conduct that does not infringe on 
the freedom of others.”149 
One of the primary libertarian objections to the imposition of  
other-regarding obligations is that all persons, not only victims, are ends 
in themselves; thus persons who are bystanders should not be 
“instrumentalized”—used as means for the interests of others. Freedom, 
like mercy, cuts both ways. Richard Wright explains this foundational 
norm as “equal individual freedom” as contrasted with “maximization of 
aggregate social welfare”: 
[G]iven the Kantian requirement of treating others as ends rather than 
merely as means, it is impermissible to use someone as a mere means 
to your ends by exposing him (or his resources) to significant 
foreseeable unaccepted risks, regardless of how greatly the benefit to 
you might outweigh the risk to him.150 
It follows, then, from the principle of protecting “negative freedom”—the 
principle which guards against “unjustified interference with one’s use of 
one’s existing resources to pursue one’s project or life plan”—that such 
freedom would be “completely undermined if one must always weigh the 
interests of all others equally with one’s own when deciding how to deploy 
one’s existing resources.”151 
                                                     
 148. See generally Uelmen, Mapping a Method, supra note 6 (discussing the challenge that, in 
W.B. Gallie’s turn of the phrase, “essentially contested concepts” pose for the work of bridging 
Catholic social thought and liberal theory). 
 149. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, § 37 cmt. e. 
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Arthur Ripstein’s “equal freedom” argument against a civil duty to 
rescue is similar. Within a realm in which all persons bear a “special 
responsibility for their own lives” in order to pursue their own ends as they 
see fit, “equal freedom” also includes the notion that “one person’s liberty 
will not be limited unilaterally by another’s vulnerability, nor one person’s 
security limited unilaterally by another person’s choices.”152 
One can understand how this analysis might inform the articulation 
of limits to a positive obligation to assist another. For Wright, Kantian 
moral theory provides a key to understanding the distinction between 
moral and legal obligations to assist: 
No person can be used solely as a means for the benefit of others, 
which means that no one can be legally required to go beyond the 
requirements of Right (corrective justice and distributive justice) if 
such obligation would require a significant sacrifice of one’s 
autonomy or freedom for the alleged greater good of others.153 
Any extension of the obligation would fall under the realm of ethics, 
namely beneficence, rather than law, “because it is only specifiable as an 
indeterminate ‘broad’ duty, which varies depending on each would-be 
benefactor’s own resources and needs, rather than as a determinate (and 
hence legally enforceable) ‘strict’ duty.”154 
Some of the libertarian claims come to a rather sharp point. As 
philosopher Michael Menlowe summarized, the Kantian concept of 
treating persons as ends and not means is considered by some as support 
for a “right of self-ownership”—the right to use one’s energy and one’s 
possessions as one likes—and a prohibition against using persons as 
resources for others.155 As a general principle, the law ought not require a 
person to act in a way that restricts one’s liberty for the sake of the needs 
of another except by voluntary agreement.156 On the contrary, if I am 
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required to promote the good, I may be prohibited from regarding my own 
interests as special, and then my integrity is threatened.157 Summarizing 
how concerns in this genre have been expressed as a kind of zero-sum 
game, he quips: “The more I have to do for other people, the less I can do 
for myself.”158 Similarly, in A Theory of Strict Liability, Richard Epstein 
reasoned: “Once one decides that . . . an individual is required under some 
circumstance to act at his own cost for the exclusive benefit of another, 
then it is very hard to set out in a principled manner the limits of social 
interference with individual liberty.”159 
But if the situation poses only a minimal inconvenience to the 
bystander’s freedom, isn’t it an incredible mismatch to compare this 
relatively trivial interest with the pressing needs of a vulnerable person 
whose life or health is in serious danger? For libertarians, though, the 
inquiry turns not on weighing, measuring, comparing, or matching 
interests but on protecting the principle that the individual holds the right 
to decide what to do or not to do in a circumstance like this without state 
coercion.160 
B. Pope Francis’s Different Point of Reference  
for Defining Freedom 
Now for something completely different. Not surprisingly, Pope 
Francis’s theological framework leads him to articulate a very different 
notion of freedom. For example, speaking with teenagers, he directly 
addressed aspects of some libertarian notions of freedom: 
At this point in life you feel also a great longing for freedom. Many 
people will say to you that freedom means doing whatever you want. 
But here you have to be able to say no. Freedom is not the ability 
simply to do what I want. This makes us self-centered and aloof, and 
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1398 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 40:1359 
it prevents us from being open and sincere friends. Instead, freedom 
is the gift of being able to choose the good. The free person is the one 
who chooses what is good, what is pleasing to God, even if it requires 
effort.161 
On another occasion, Pope Francis warned that it is precisely in 
opting for “ease and convenience, for confusing happiness with 
consumption” that we end up losing our freedom.162 In contrast, it is 
precisely the path of encountering the needs of others, in “making of your 
own lives a gift to him and to others,” that one discovers what it means to 
be free.163 
Explaining this concept in light of a reflection on attention to the 
needs of others, Pope Francis gave the following example: 
True freedom is always given to [the Church] by the Lord. Freedom, 
first of all from sin, from selfishness in all its forms: freedom to give 
of oneself and to do it with joy, like the Virgin of Nazareth, who is 
free of herself, does not close in on herself in her condition—and she 
would indeed have had cause!—but thinks of those who in that 
moment are in greater need. She is free in the freedom of God, which 
is manifest in love. And this is the freedom that God has given to us, 
and we must not lose it: the freedom to adore God, to serve God and 
to serve him also in our brothers.164 
Using a colorful image, the Pope also noted that this kind of freedom 
can transform even the “existential grayness” of sadness, fear, internal 
emptiness, isolation, regret, and complaints. It can also bring us beyond 
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many new forms of slavery are created in our time in the name of a false freedom! . . . We need God 
to free us from every form of indifference, selfishness and self-sufficiency.”). 
 164. Pope Francis, Homily: Pastoral Visit to the Dioceses of Campobasso-Boiano and Isernia-
Venafro (July 5, 2014), https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/homilies/2014/documents/papa-
francesco_20140705_molise-omelia.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LLE-5AGC]. 
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the “negative attitudes” that make people more self-referential and “more 
concerned with defending themselves than with giving of themselves.”165 
While the concepts are attractive and profound, the form of the 
discourse, its biblical and doctrinal points of reference, and its underlying 
foundations seem distant from the discourse of legal theory. What 
interdisciplinary resources might help to bridge the divide? The next 
Section explores how the work of two legal theorists might help with this 
task. 
C. A Legal-Philosophical Bridge: Three Senses of Autonomy 
1. Richard Fallon: Descriptive and Ascriptive Autonomy 
A 1994 analysis by Richard Fallon, “Two Senses of Autonomy,” can 
help to illuminate many of the difficult questions previously discussed.166 
Recognizing autonomy as a “protean concept” that means “different things 
to different people” and at times appears “to change its meaning in the 
course of a single argument,”167 Fallon parses the different “senses” in 
which autonomy is used and how these interpretations interact with 
concepts of negative and positive liberty.168 
In a “descriptive” sense, autonomy refers to the actual conditions that 
enable people to be meaningfully self-governed—for example, freedom 
from coercion, manipulation, and temporary distortion of judgment. 
Fallon notes, “Someone who is drugged or hallucinating or who acts in 
panic has reduced autonomy and may not be autonomous at all.”169 The 
presence or absence of these factors is a matter of degree that can be 
mapped along a continuum.170 
In an “ascriptive” sense, “autonomy represents the purported 
metaphysical foundation of people’s capacity and also their right to make 
and act on their own decisions, even if those decisions are ill-considered 
or substantively unwise.”171 In this sense, Fallon explains, “Ascriptive 
autonomy—the autonomy that we ascribe to ourselves and others as the 
foundation of a right to make self-regarding decisions—is a moral 
entailment of personhood.”172 The image that best captures this notion of 
                                                     
 165. Id. 
 166. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875 (1994). 
 167. Id. at 876. 
 168. See id. (“In rough terms, negative liberty is freedom from external interference in doing or 
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autonomy is one of a sphere of “personal sovereignty” bounded by respect 
for the rights of others.173 This quality is not a matter of degree, but inheres 
in one’s person.174 
Fallon then analyzes how varying emphases on either negative or 
positive freedom make a difference in discussions about autonomy in the 
law of freedom of expression. For example, for those who emphasize 
“negative” liberty, descriptive autonomy was often assumed to be a 
baseline feature of interactions in a market economy.175 For that reason, 
the bar for prohibition of certain aspects of freedom of expression was 
placed at “freedom from interferences such as coercion, manipulation, or 
temporary distortion of judgment.”176 As Fallon notes, “positive” 
libertarians would critique this notion as somewhat thin: “To be an 
ethically attractive concept, autonomy must imply some degree of critical 
awareness and self-control. A person who acts entirely voluntarily, but 
without self-awareness or self-control, is not self-governing in any 
ethically attractive or descriptively useful sense.”177 
But, a remaining weakness of the arguments for autonomy as viewed 
through a positive libertarian lens is the difficulty in articulating how 
competing claims on contested questions should be compared or weighed: 
“A merely quantitative comparison seems inadequate; positive freedom 
connotes not just power, but moral reasonableness under shared 
standards.”178 
Addressing the weaknesses and weaving in the strengths of each 
perspective, Fallon attempts to synthesize the criteria for descriptive 
autonomy as depending on these four conditions: 1) critical and  
self-critical ability; 2) competence to act; 3) sufficient options; and 4) 
independence of coercion and manipulation.179 For example, the 
development of critical and self-critical ability brings the subject beyond 
slavish reactions to an impulse of the moment: “Autonomy requires the 
capacity to reflect upon, order, and self-critically revise the tastes, 
passions, and desire that present themselves as reasons for action. It is this 
human capacity that enables persons to experience a sense of rational 
authorship of their ‘higher-order plans of action.’”180 Freedom from 
                                                     
 173. Id. at 878, 890. 
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“coercion” zeroes in on “the deliberate and wrongful subjecting of one 
human being to the will of another or domination that disrespects the 
other’s equal moral worth.”181 
He then queries: which sense of autonomy ought to receive priority 
and in which contexts?182 It would seem, he argues, that the distinctions 
between self-regarding and other-regarding action would offer a 
promising method for distinguishing the domains. “Descriptive autonomy 
matters exclusively in cases of other-regarding action, where the 
boundaries of private rights must be defined; ascriptive autonomy matters 
most, and possibly exclusively, in cases of self-regarding action and 
contemplated paternalistic responses.”183 However, given the fluidity of 
some aspects of these boundaries and the unsurprising difficulties in 
defining “harm,” Fallon admits that neat categories prove to be elusive.184 
He concludes: “Descriptive and ascriptive autonomy are both fundamental 
to our understanding of ourselves and of personhood. When their claims 
pull in different directions, there is no reliable formula for assigning 
priority.” 185 
Notwithstanding this tension, this framework sheds much light on 
the central questions of this Article. First, respect for ascriptive autonomy 
might actually run parallel to the complex implications of mercy, including 
respect for the reasons why bystanders may choose not to intervene—
regardless of whether this decision is grounded in other priorities, how 
those priorities are weighed, and the power of emotional obstacles or other 
kinds of affective input. 
Second, what is especially helpful about Fallon’s synthesis of 
descriptive autonomy is how it highlights certain features of a person’s 
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 185. Id. at 899. 
1402 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 40:1359 
encounter with a victim in need of emergency assistance. By definition, 
the victim exemplifies the far end of the spectrum of the lack of descriptive 
autonomy—unable to act and foreclosed from the usual range of  
options—and for this reason, also highly vulnerable to coercion or 
manipulation by others. 
It is interesting to note that the bystander may also be deficient in 
some aspects of descriptive autonomy. For example, some bystanders may 
be in need of self-critical reflection regarding the definition of freedom, 
perhaps even along the lines of what Pope Francis suggests. Here, 
reflection grounded in his critique of the globalization of indifference may 
actually increase the descriptive autonomy of the bystander because it may 
open the person to a deeper sense of “rational authorship” over one’s own 
conduct and one’s interaction with another human being. To the extent that 
there may be a crowd or gang-type coercive effect on those who interact 
with victims, an obligation to treat the victim as an end may help to free 
the individuals in the crowd from this kind of coercion and manipulation. 
2. Jennifer Nedelsky: Relational Autonomy 
Can we push the envelope even further to support an argument that 
in certain circumstances a legal obligation would not only not hinder 
ascriptive or descriptive autonomy, but could also actually foster freedom? 
Or on the flip side, to argue that acts that deliberately demonstrate 
indifference to the humanity of the victim may actually detract from 
freedom—and cause harm—not only to the victim but also to the 
bystander? 
Note how this possibility is easily obfuscated by starker versions of 
the libertarian claim: If I am required to promote good, I may be prohibited 
from regarding my own interests as special, and then my integrity is 
threatened.186 Tight analysis can distinguish the varying elements—for 
example, the problem is not in promoting the interests of others, but in 
being required and perhaps legally obliged to do so. Interests are not 
necessarily always in tension. Notwithstanding these distinctions, the 
analysis still creates a certain tension between “the good” (including the 
good of others) and “my special interests,” which easily lends itself to 
distortion. Framed in this way, it is easy to slide into a kind of zero-sum 
game balancing act: at the heart of my integrity is the promotion of my 
own interests as special, and in particular, the promotion of my own 
interests over those of others. 
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What alternative philosophical foundation might help to avoid this 
zero-sum game?187 In a thoughtful survey of the feminist critique of 
liberalism, Linda McClain notices the tendency of feminists and liberals 
to talk past each other when it comes to defining and understanding the 
role of autonomy.188 She recounts: “Negative valuation of autonomy is 
crucial in assessing feminist critiques of liberalism. . . . Feminist critics 
have associated autonomy with indifference, isolation, separation, and 
lack of connection.”189 But autonomy, McClain submits, need not be 
atomistic. In fact, as it turns out, responsibility to others “resembles 
autonomy in the sense of freedom to make choices about one’s life.”190 Let 
us see why. 
One eloquent and in-depth exploration of autonomy understood in 
these constructive terms is Jennifer Nedelsky’s opus, Law’s Relations.191 
Like McClain, Nedelsky critiques the superficial and snarky tendency to 
utter the catchphrase “autonomous individuals” with a derisive sneer.192 
Rather than giving up on the concept of autonomy, Nedelsky’s strategy is 
to re-theorize it within the rubric of “relational autonomy.”193 Aware of 
quips that “relational autonomy” is an oxymoron,194 she recognizes the 
challenge of the project. “Why choose a value that is practically 
synonymous with the liberal, individualistic approach I want to supplant 
or at least shift?” 195 Nedelsky argues that much is at stake: 
I think that feminism, and indeed all other emancipatory projects I 
know of, cannot do without an adequate conception of autonomy. It 
is too central to our aspirations not to let others define our lives, 
constrain our opportunities, or exclude us from the power to shape 
collective norms . . . . I argue that we cannot afford to cede the 
meaning of autonomy to the liberal tradition and that we should 
redefine rather than resist the term.196 
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Noting the reality of our pervasive dependence on others for the possibility 
of autonomy, she surmises that the concept of autonomy can be reduced 
neither to independence nor to control.197 
In contrast to a “separative self,” who “clinging to the rights that 
affirm its separateness”198 establishes boundaries according to the harm 
principle,199 and in contrast to a “simple plurality of independent beings 
whose inherent rights and obligations mediate their encounters with each 
other,”200 Nedelsky articulates a “relational” view of persons based on an 
ontological claim that persons are constituted in their identity—which 
includes the development of autonomous self-governance—in and by their 
relationships. She explains: “On a relational view, the persons whose 
rights and well-being are at stake are constituted by their relationships such 
that is it only in the context of those relationships that one can understand 
how to foster their capacities, define and protect their rights, or promote 
their well-being.”201 
According to Nedelsky, Hannah Arendt’s theory of judgment, which 
builds on Kant’s, is a promising resource for this project.202 For Arendt, 
she explains: 
 Judgment requires taking into account the perspectives of others 
in forming one’s own judgment. It is a cognitive ability that is only 
possible in a social context. 
. . .  
One cannot be autonomous without doing the work of exercising 
judgment about how one engages with the inevitable conditions, 
desires, interests, or aspirations one has.203 
Arendt’s framework opens out toward the informative and corrective input 
of other’s perspectives, which can also be a path to a deeper notion of 
freedom. As Nedelsky explains: 
One can learn to exercise judgment well, to use the perspectives of 
others to become conscious of one’s presuppositions and biases. For 
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Arendt, to exercise judgment is to exercise it autonomously. As we 
use the perspectives of others to liberate ourselves from our private 
idiosyncracies, we become free to make value judgments. Indeed, I 
see a reciprocal relation between judgment and autonomy. Each 
requires the other, and experience with one enhances the other: as we 
exercise judgment about the values we want to embrace, we become 
more fully autonomous; as we become more autonomous, our 
capacity for judgment increases.204 
Assessing theories that describe autonomy as the “internal” 
dimension of freedom, which is a combination of self-creation and of what 
happens to a person,205 Nedelsky critiques that “not everything that is 
internal is either arrived at autonomously or conducive to autonomy. 
Indeed, some of what is internal, such as fears, anxieties, and even a sense 
of duty, can interfere with the exercise of judgment.”206 Instead, 
distinguished from the core of “agency”—making a choice—the concept 
of autonomy includes self-governance.207 
The process of developing autonomy, or finding “one’s law,” is 
inherently relational. The law becomes one’s own, but it is not self-made: 
“the individual develops it but in connection with others; it is not simply 
chosen, as if from an unlimited market place of options, but recognized, 
developed and affirmed.”208 Nedelsky opens out the relational dynamic of 
this process: 
The idea that there are commands that one recognizes as one’s own, 
requirements that constrain one’s life but come from the meaning or 
purpose of that life, captures the basic connection between law and 
freedom—which is perhaps the essence of the concept of autonomy. 
The necessary social dimension of the vision that I am sketching has 
two components. The first is the claim that the capacity to find one’s 
own law can develop only if the context of relations that nurture this 
capacity. The second is that the “content” of one’s own law is 
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comprehensible only with reference to shared social norms, values 
and concepts.209  
Within the framework of “relational autonomy,” autonomy is 
perceived not so much as space to protect one’s own interests to the 
exclusion of others, but rather an exercise in discernment of how, in this 
particular circumstance, to best apply the maxim of caring about the 
humanity of others—including the particular others who are close to  
me—as I care about my own. Returning to our bystander cases, respect for 
the needed space for bystander discretion to exercise autonomy can be 
analytically distinguished from grander claims about promotion of or 
interference with freedom in the broader sense of an existential or 
ontological state. 
When autonomy is understood within a relational framework, it is 
easier to see that reasons to refrain from imposing rescue obligations on 
pure bystanders need not be grounded in an ontological claim about 
autonomy and certainly need not be framed as an affirmation of unfettered 
liberty to disregard the urgent needs of vulnerable others. Instead, what 
becomes clearer is that one reason the coercive power of the law should 
stay its hand is because of the limits of the law—and more precisely, 
because of the law’s incapacity to clearly define how in an emergency a 
given subject should discern the contours of his or her own response to the 
needs of another human being. The reason to be cautious about imposing 
legal obligations is grounded not in a generic hands-off claim about the 
bystander’s freedom. Rather, it is grounded in an awareness that in certain 
circumstances, for example, in the face of violence, it may be difficult for 
the law to probe the thoughts and emotions that would have informed the 
risks as the bystander perceived them. Because respect for autonomy in 
making decisions is just one aspect of freedom, to claim that the law 
should leave room for a bystander’s discernment—especially in the face 
of violence—is not to equate “freedom” with the “right” not to be bothered 
by the urgent needs of others. 
As Nedelsky summarizes, “A relational approach always directs 
attention to context and consequences. In asking how a law structures 
relationships it directs attention to the difference context makes, to how 
the law affects different people in different circumstances.”210 With what 
I find to be a lovely touch of personal and institutional modesty, Nedelsky 
explains the potential impact of relational habits of mind: 
I think habits of relational thinking, in the realm of rights as in others, 
would foster both compassion and intelligent responsibility. Seeing 
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ourselves in relation to others would not generate inflated and 
overwhelming ideas about the scope of our responsibilities to cure all 
evils. It could be the basis for a more reasonable judgment about the 
limits of our power as individuals as well as the desirable forms of 
power we exercise collectively.211 
I agree, and suggest that a relational conception of autonomy can 
hold together the complex layers of the interior life and decision-making 
process of bystanders. It can also meld appreciation from a subjective 
point of view for the limitations that might inform bystanders’ engagement 
with the needs of others, with a concept of the human person as finding 
both freedom and meaning in attention to the needs and realities of others. 
D. Full Circle: A Theological Model in Dialogue with Legal Theory 
Is it possible to bridge Pope Francis’s theological reflections on 
freedom, grounded as they are in Christian insights and doctrine, with 
these knotty problems in legal theory? I think so, especially when his 
teachings are placed into the context of and understood as an expression 
of the wide and deep currents of the tradition of Catholic social thought. 
Because of Pope Francis’s largely successful style of communication that 
some see as uniquely capable of reaching the contemporary world, some 
are tempted to interpret his teaching as deviating from previous 
pontificates, and from the sweep of the tradition as a whole. This 
interpretation is a mistake—not only because this view fails to appreciate 
the profound continuity between his teachings and those of other Popes 
but also because it truncates access to a deep reservoir of resources for 
reflection on social themes. 
For example, it is interesting to place Pope Francis’s reflections on 
freedom into the context of a recent body of work in Christian theological 
scholarship and commentary that offers a further resource for reflection on 
relationality as constitutive of identity and, therefore, also in harmony with 
human freedom. The reflection begins with the premise that to understand 
the attribute of God as love implies that God is a community of  
Persons—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—a Trinity, bound together as One 
in relationships of love. Thus, the interior life of God is constituted by 
relationships of love. Because God’s own identity is love, it is at its core a 
relational reality. 
Building on an interpretation of Genesis 1:26–27, which describes 
humankind as made in the divine image (imago Dei), Christian theology 
extends the analogy between the life of God and human relationships.212 
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Humanity is made in the image of a God who loves, and it finds its own 
identity, and therefore its freedom, in building and living within 
relationships of love with other human beings. Because relationality is 
constitutive of identity for human beings made in the image of God, so 
also autonomy—discovery of one’s own law—would be in accord with 
this ontological ground. As a recent Catholic Church summary of the 
social teaching explains: 
The revelation in Christ of the mystery of God as Trinitarian love is 
at the same time the revelation of the vocation of the human person 
to love. This revelation sheds light on every aspect of the personal 
dignity and freedom of men and women, and on the depths of their 
social nature.213 
This summary reflects how the analogy was also an important feature 
of the Second Vatican Council’s principal reflection on the Church’s 
dialogue with the modern world, Gaudium et spes. Referring to the text 
from the Gospel of John in which Jesus prays to the Father “that they may 
all be one,”214 the Council Fathers explained that this horizon implies “that 
there is a certain parallel between the union existing among the divine 
Persons and the union of the children of God in truth and love.”215 This 
document also draws out the anthropological and ethical implications: 
“This likeness reveals that man, who is the only creature on earth which 
God willed for itself, cannot fully find himself except through a sincere 
gift of himself.”216 
Within this vision, the ultimate identity, vocation, and destiny of the 
human person is to fulfill oneself by “creating a network of multiple 
relationships of love, justice, and solidarity with other persons,” as one 
goes about one’s various activities in the world.217 In a later reflection on 
the application of this model, under the rubric of a “spirituality of 
communion,” Pope Saint John Paul II explained how the connection 
between “contemplation of the mystery of the Trinity dwelling in us” 
should bring Christians to discern that same light “shining on the face of 
brothers and sisters around us.”218 Specifically, “a spirituality of 
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communion also means an ability to think of our brothers and sister in faith 
within the profound unity of the Mystical Body, and therefore as ‘those 
who are a part of me.’”219 In contrast, when the human person does not 
recognize in oneself and in others the value and grandeur of the human 
person, one effectively deprives oneself of the possibility of benefiting 
from his humanity and of entering into that relationship of solidarity and 
communion with others for which one was created by God.220 
Recalling the libertarian references to Kant’s moral theory, it is 
evident that the Kantian framework is generally understood to be more 
individualistic than these Catholic teachings. But, it is interesting to note 
that their conception of freedom and dignity are surprisingly similar to 
Kant’s conception. As Gaudium noted, autonomous discernment is an 
important aspect of human dignity: “[M]an’s dignity demands that he act 
according to a knowing and free choice that is personally motivated and 
prompted from within, not under blind internal impulse nor by mere 
external pressure.”221 Like a Kantian understanding of autonomy 
previously discussed, dignity is grounded in emancipation from “all 
captivity to passion” in order to pursue one’s goals “in a spontaneous 
choice of what is good.”222 
Social isolation weakens freedom, while attention to the obligations 
inherent in social life fortifies it: 
 [H]uman freedom is often crippled when a man encounters 
extreme poverty just as it withers when he indulges in too many of 
life’s comforts and imprisons himself in a kind of splendid isolation. 
Freedom acquires new strength, by contrast, when a man consents to 
the unavoidable requirements of social life, takes on the manifold 
demands of human partnership, and commits himself to the service 
of the human community.223  
In one of his most developed teaching documents, the encyclical 
letter Laudato si’, Pope Francis beautifully summarizes this doctrine and 
also draws out its implications for the entire cosmos: 
The divine Persons are subsistent relations, and the world, created 
according to the divine model, is a web of relationships. Creatures 
tend towards God, and in turn it is proper to every living being to tend 
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towards other things, so that throughout the universe we can find any 
number of constant and secretly interwoven relationships. This leads 
us not only to marvel at the manifold connections existing among 
creatures, but also to discover a key to our own fulfilment. The human 
person grows more, matures more and is sanctified more to the extent 
that he or she enters into relationships, going out from themselves to 
live in communion with God, with others and with all creatures. In 
this way, they make their own that trinitarian dynamism which God 
imprinted in them when they were created. Everything is 
interconnected, and this invites us to develop a spirituality of that 
global solidarity which flows from the mystery of the Trinity.224 
What are some of the philosophical implications of this framework 
as it addresses libertarian arguments about the obligations of bystanders? 
To paraphrase Pope Saint John Paul II, if I do not recognize in others the 
value and grandeur of the human person, I effectively deprive myself of 
the possibility of entering into a relationship of solidarity and communion 
with others—which is my destiny and identity as a human being.225 
Deliberate indifference to the needs of others harms not only the victim 
but also the person who so denies another’s humanity—for to do so is to 
deny a core aspect of what it means to be human—that is, to recognize the 
humanity of others.226 
Looking at relationships through a Trinitarian lens strengthens the 
“rationality” of respecting the dignity of others not only because I owe 
them the same freedom that I claim, but because the other is “a part of 
me,” and my own fulfillment and happiness hinges on the possibility of 
“creating a network of multiple relationships of love, justice, and 
solidarity” with others.227 If it is through the free gift of self that one finds 
oneself, then to respect another person’s dignity and integrity is to express 
the depths of one’s own humanity. 
The analogy to Trinitarian theology also provides a lens to  
“re-envision” the seeming tautology undergirding structures for analyzing 
altruism. To recognize the humanity of a vulnerable person in need of 
assistance is not so much a matter of reaching beyond the boundaries of 
myself and my own identity in order to determine how aware or how 
generous to be. Rather, such recognition is a logical consequence of an 
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ontological claim about the nature of my own being, and what it means to 
act in accord with my own identity as a human being fundamentally 
connected to other human beings.228 
The Trinitarian analogy can help to articulate a critique not only of 
atomistic individualism but also of the seemingly positive alternate: 
altruism, understood as “true” only if it cuts against my own selfish 
interests.229 I realize that neither line of argument must necessarily be 
attributed to a libertarian philosophical stance, but the creep from a stance 
in political theory to a larger cultural claim is nonetheless frequent. 
Pushing the envelope on how to articulate the content of a bystander’s 
freedom, one might query the extent to which these kinds of claims 
regarding altruism actually exacerbate a tautological tension between the 
self and others. 
Through the lens of the Trinitarian analogy, the reciprocal quality of 
human interactions comes into focus. Coming full circle in another way, 
it is interesting to note the continuity between the teachings of Pope 
Francis on mercy and how Pope Saint John Paul II explained the dynamic 
in his encyclical letter on mercy, Dives in misericordia: 
In reciprocal relationships between persons merciful love is never a 
unilateral act or process. Even in the cases in which everything would 
seem to indicate that only one party is giving and offering, and the 
other only receiving and taking (for example, in the case of a 
physician giving treatment, a teacher teaching, parents supporting 
and bringing up their children, a benefactor helping the needy), in 
reality the one who gives is always also a beneficiary. In any case, he 
too can easily find himself in the position of the one who receives, 
who obtains a benefit, who experiences merciful love; he too can find 
himself the object of mercy.230 
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Further, it is interesting to return to the Parable of the Good 
Samaritan in light of this framework. The Parable is frequently read as a 
model of altruism, as the quintessential example of what it means to go 
out of one’s way in order to serve another’s needs. For example, Martin 
Luther King, Jr., in the sermon he delivered on the eve of his assassination, 
referred to the Good Samaritan story as part of a powerful plea for the 
support of the striking sanitation workers in Memphis, Tennessee. Dr. 
King endorsed the Good Samaritan as a model of one who, on that 
“dangerous curve” from Jerusalem to Jericho, was able to move beyond 
fear in order to “project the ‘I’ into the ‘thou’ and to be concerned about 
his brother.”231 Dr. King pointed out the contrast with the Levite who 
asked: “If I stop to help this man, what will happen to me?” But the Good 
Samaritan was able to “reverse the question” and asked, “If I do not stop 
to help this man, what will happen to him?”232 
The theological models discussed above suggest other ways to 
reverse the question. Another way to frame what is at stake is to see that it 
is not only the well-being, health, safety, or survival of another human 
being but also my own identity and integrity as a person. Thus, the question 
becomes not only what will happen to the victim if I do not stop to help 
but also what will happen to me? What will become of my own identity, 
my own humanity, if I fail to recognize the humanity of the other? 
Through this lens, one can discern how the seminal rescue story, the 
Parable of the Good Samaritan, seems especially set on driving home this 
point. Recall that Jesus shifts the question from an inquiry into the 
categorical definitions of “who is my neighbor” to what it means to be a 
neighbor. As previously discussed, in the text of the parable itself, the 
word σπλαγχνίζεσθαι, often translated as “moved with compassion,” is 
better translated to be rawer, more reactive, and “moved from the gut.”233 
Instead, in discussing the Parable with Jesus, the lawyer persisted in 
expressing himself with the elegant eleo—to show mercy.234 
The Trinitarian analogy helps to highlight an important dimension of 
the text and the meaning of σπλαγχνίζεσθαι—to be moved from the gut. 
Shocked, the lawyer was able to move a few steps in Jesus’ direction by 
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recognizing that a hated enemy could demonstrate kindness. But “to show 
mercy” is not the same as σπλαγχνίζεσθαι. In comparison with 
σπλαγχνίζεσθαι, “mercy” retains a certain sense of control in which one 
reaches out, from one’s power, to assist the needy. Perhaps the lawyer was 
unable to move beyond his own structures of power in order to fully 
appreciate the depth dimension of σπλαγχνίζεσθαι. It may have been the 
best that the lawyer could do, and in any case, to “do” mercy would have 
been an improvement over the lawyer’s superficial recitation of the 
principle at stake. But it would be reductive to conclude that eleo fully 
captures the involvement of the whole person—including one’s emotional 
core—to which Jesus is referring with the word σπλαγχνίζεσθαι. The text 
of the Parable illustrates how the lawyer was not yet able to reach the 
depths of love that Jesus was demonstrating in his story. 
In this light, it would also be helpful to revisit Jesus’ invitation to 
shift one’s perception of an encounter with a neighbor’s needs—to move 
away from seeing others as simply a passive object of merciful attention 
toward an appreciation of a deeper “gut level” connection. This can help 
to explain the meaning of Jesus shifting the question from “who is my 
neighbor?” to “[what does it mean to be a neighbor?” The verb 
σπλαγχνίζεσθαι indicates that the work of the disciple is no longer to 
define passive objects of mercy but to completely shift one’s orientation 
toward the world, and therefore, to every human being. If “mercy” is not 
the punch line, then perhaps neither is the core question how to determine 
the boundaries for who should be the passive object of one’s assistance, 
“who is my neighbor?”235 
The verb σπλαγχνίζεσθαι suggests that the stance Jesus describes 
implies the recognition of one’s fundamental—physiological, emotional, 
and intellectual—bond to every human being and then on this basis, the 
work of understanding what it means to be a neighbor in various 
circumstances as they present themselves. In this Parable, it seems that the 
one who exemplified the fulfillment of the law is a person who let himself 
be seized by an overwhelming emotional and perhaps even irrational 
response to the sight of another human being in need, to the point of taking 
some extraordinary risks to meet the other’s needs. 
So would not this model of human freedom and fulfillment point in 
the direction of a clear moral obligation to help in any and all 
circumstances? Christian scriptures and tradition are certainly not void of 
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exhortations, examples, and encouragement to find meaning and personal 
fulfillment in self-sacrifice—with the model par excellence being that of 
the sacrificial love of Christ who risked contact with a hostile humanity to 
the point of being sentenced to die on a cross: “Greater love has no man 
than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends.”236 And perhaps that 
is the point: the models are offered to people and communities who have 
had a long track record of severe limitations in the extent to which they 
recognize each other’s humanity and treat each other according to that 
grandeur. The image of the Good Samaritan as “moved from the gut” is 
compelling because it illustrates Jesus’ appreciation for the extent to which 
human beings act on impulse and also shows that he was not a moralist. 
Numerous other stories in the Christian scriptures recount God’s mercy 
when human beings fail to live up to the relational nature of their own 
identity. All of this can inform a searching “examination of conscience” 
on the extent to which one may or may not have exercised one’s discretion 
in order to meet one’s moral obligations to respond to the needs of others. 
Strong models for relational identity and relational autonomy rooted 
in both secular and theological sources help to dislodge libertarian claims 
that freedom may be found in the absence of connections to others or in 
neglect of their needs. These models may also further strengthen a sense 
of moral obligation to respond to another’s needs when at all possible and 
within one’s physical and psychological capacities. But neither the secular 
nor the theological models of relational autonomy constitute a necessary 
incursion on the exercise of discretion. Both leave space to discern what 
to do in a given situation where a vulnerable person is in need of 
emergency assistance. And neither model answers the question about what 
the coercive force of state law should require of a bystander. 
CONCLUSION 
So would Pope Francis support a common law rule that bystanders 
should be legally required to come to the emergency assistance of a victim 
in need, when to do so would impose no significant risk on the bystander? 
Notwithstanding his strong moral condemnation of increasing indifference 
to the various ways in which strangers are drowning before our eyes, I 
believe he would appreciate how difficult it may be to probe the factors 
that inform a bystander’s interior state of mind and decision-making 
process. 
It would be important to note, however, that such caution would not 
be framed as concern for a threat to the freedom or integrity of the 
bystander, in the sense that coming to another’s aid requires a zero-sum 
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balance of interests. Instead, the focus may be more on the limits of the 
law—and the law’s difficulty in probing the lines between cruel 
indifference and understandable fear, paralysis, distraction, or the like. 
Most of us are not heroes. This is why we need to work together to address, 
beyond the confines of a direct response to an emergency, the complex 
social and economic problems that make life—and survival—so difficult, 
especially for those who suffer the most. 
